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(WHEN) CAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM JUSTIFY 
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION?—A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
Noa Mendelsohn Aviv* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Is it justifiable to ban LGBTQ-positive resources from a 
public school classroom because of the religious views of some 
parents?1 Should bed and breakfast owners be permitted, on the 
basis of their religious beliefs, to cancel the room reservation of a 
gay couple?2 What about a printer whose religious beliefs are in 
conflict with the material he’s being asked to produce for the Gay 
and Lesbian Archives?3 And how should we respond to marriage 
commissioners, acting on behalf of the province, who refuse to 
perform same-sex marriages as to do so would violate their 
religious beliefs?4 These are some of the questions that have faced 
Canadian courts and human rights tribunals in the past number of 
years. 
The underlying question in these cases asks: in what 
circumstances, if ever, will a service provider’s beliefs justify 
exempting them from the duty to provide services without 
                                                          
* Noa Mendelsohn Aviv is Director of the Equality Program at the Canadian 
Civil Liberties Association (CCLA). The author thanks Cara Zwibel and 
Richard Moon for their time and insights. The opinions expressed in this paper 
are those of the author. 
1 See Chamberlain v. Surrey Sch. Dist. No. 36 (2002), 4 S.C.R. 710 
(Can.). 
2 See Eadie v. Riverbend Bed & Breakfast, 2012 BCHRT 247 (Can.). 
3 See Ontario Human Rights Comm’n v. Brockie (2002), 161 O.A.C. 324 
(Can. On. Sup. Ct. J.). 
4 See In re Marriage Comm’rs Appointed under the Marriage Act, 2011 
SCKA 3 (Can.). 
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discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender 
identity? The conflict in these “belief-based exemption cases,” as 
they will be referred to in this Article, arises in the clash between 
two fundamental and constitutionally protected rights, freedom of 
religion and equality—a clash that does not readily lend itself to 
reconciliation.  
Conflicts between fundamental rights are never easy, in 
particular when they elicit highly emotive topics that touch on 
deeply held fundamental beliefs. And in Canadian law, there is a 
well-established principle that when it comes to the fundamental 
rights and freedoms protected in the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (the “Charter”),5 there is no hierarchy: rather than 
staking out a “trump” right that will always prevail, the courts 
are required to judge each case in its specific context.6 This has 
not been an easy task for the adjudicative bodies charged with 
deciding the belief-based exemption cases. 
This Article provides a critical analysis of four belief-based 
exemption decisions in Canada and considers what lessons (and 
cautionary tales) can be learned from them to help resolve future 
such cases. These lessons include the following: the issues are 
complex, and as such, cannot be resolved in the abstract. Such 
cases must be resolved in context on a case-by-case basis in 
consideration of the evidence before the adjudicating body. A 
Canadian Charter section 1 analysis may be particularly helpful in 
this analysis. Solutions will likely be difficult, and one 
fundamental right or the other may be violated. In addition, 
adjudicators should take heed of their own prejudices and avoid 
perpetuating in the courtroom the kind of discrimination at play in 
society. Likewise, courts should be aware of their own biases and 
recognize the genuine issues and rights at stake on both sides of 
the conflict. Both equality and freedom of religion are 
fundamental rights in Canada. For many individuals and groups, 
their religious convictions underlie a strong belief in the inherent 
dignity, worth, and equality of all people. For others, their 
                                                          
5 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.). 
6 Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79 (Can.) (citing Dagenais 
v. Canadian Broad. Corp. (1994), 120 D.L.R. 4th 12 (Can. S.S.C.)). 
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religion includes beliefs about proper conduct and practice and 
how to interact with those who do not conform to these standards. 
This may take the form of denying service to LGBTQ 
individuals, for example, by denying them services. A secular 
legal system must continue to recognize the sincerity of religious 
beliefs, even if many in our society take issue with the content of 
these beliefs. On the other side, discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation and gender identity is a current as well as a 
historic reality, and strong equality protections are critically 
needed. Therefore, another principle that emerges from the case 
law is the danger of creating sweeping exemptions or ex ante 
policies that allow, legitimize, and perpetuate such 
discrimination. Finally, in light of the breadth of potential 
exemptions and the impact they would have, exemptions that 
allow service providers to discriminate against LGBTQ people, if 
allowed at all, should be strictly exceptional.  
Given that analyses of belief-based exemptions must be made 
in context, the scope of this Article will be limited to 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the provision 
of services. In addition, given the case law, the analysis will 
focus on exemptions grounded in religious beliefs, as opposed to 
beliefs based on personal convictions and conscience. 
Part I provides a brief overview of statutory and constitutional 
protections for equality and religious freedom in Canadian law. 
Part II discusses four belief-based exemption cases from Canada, 
offering a critical analysis of the central issues, while also 
drawing out useful discussions and conclusions, and pointing out 
dangers to be avoided in future cases of this nature. Part III 
summarizes some of the central principles discussed, that may 
prove helpful in considering belief-based exemptions.  
 
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND: PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
AND EQUALITY IN CANADIAN LAW 
 
Both the right to freedom of religion and the right to equality 
are constitutionally protected in Canada, as both are guaranteed in 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Charter sets 
out the fundamental rights and freedoms protected under the 
2014.05.05 AVIV.DOCX 5/11/2014  12:35 PM 
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Canadian Constitution (of which the Charter is a part).  
Section 1 of the Charter simultaneously guarantees Charter 
rights whilst also providing for reasonable limits on those rights 
in limited circumstances, as follows: “The Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out 
in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”7 
This reasonable limits clause allows legislation and government 
action to limit Charter rights, but only if the limit is for a 
pressing and substantial objective, the means chosen by the law 
or action are rationally connected to this objective, the limit is 
minimally impairing, and the limit is proportional in that its 
deleterious effects do not outweigh its salutary ones.8 Whether or 
not a limit is reasonable must be judged in its context.9  
As to the substantive rights at issue in the belief-based 
exemption cases: Section 2 of the Charter establishes the right to 
freedom of religion and conscience (among others) as follows:  
(2) Everyone has the following fundamental 
freedoms: 
(a)   freedom of conscience and religion; 
 (b)freedom of thought, belief, opinion and 
expression, including freedom of the press and 
other media of communication; 
(c)   freedom of peaceful assembly; and 
(d)   freedom of association.10   
Section 15 of the Charter sets out the equality guarantee. 
Section 15(1) provides: “Every individual is equal before and 
under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal 
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, 
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, 
                                                          
7 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 1 (U.K.). 
8 See, e.g., Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v. Alberta, 2009 SCC 
37, para. 186 (Can.). 
9 See, e.g., Toronto Star Newspapers v. R., 2010 SCC 21, para. 3 
(Can.). 
10 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 2 (U.K.). 
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colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”11 
While the Charter protects a full array of fundamental 
rights—such as the rights to life and liberty, freedom of 
expression, and freedom of association—across Canada, there are 
also quasi-constitutional provincial, territorial, and federal 
“human rights” statutes whose focus is the prohibition against 
discrimination in such areas as housing, employment—and 
significantly for this Article—the provision of services. In other 
words, and to avoid semantic confusion, “human rights” in many 
Canadian jurisdictions is sometimes understood in its legal 
meaning as the specific right to be free from discrimination. And 
human rights tribunals are for the most part established pursuant 
to the aforementioned human rights statutes (not the Charter) to 
adjudicate complaints of discrimination under these statutes.  
Thus, belief-based exemption cases may be decided under the 
Charter and resolved through a reasonable limits test under 
section 1, or they may be decided under the human rights laws. 
 
II. CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE—FOUR BELIEF-BASED EXEMPTION 
CASES AND WHAT THEY CAN TEACH US 
 
A. Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Brockie:12 Can a 
Commercial Printer Refuse a Printing Job On the Basis 
That Its LGBTQ-Positive Content Violates His Belief? 
 
 In April 1996, Mr. Ray Brillinger went into a commercial 
print shop on behalf of the Canadian Gay and Lesbian Archives 
(“Archives”) and asked the printer to print blank letterhead and 
envelopes for the Archives, as well as some business cards for its 
officers.13 The text on the materials noted that the Archives 
“represented [the] interests of ‘gays’ and ‘lesbians’ but said 
nothing of [its] objects, activities or membership.”14 Without 
inquiring into these matters, Mr. Brockie, the president of the 
                                                          
11 Id. § 15(1).  
12 (2002) 161 O.A.C. 324 (Can. On. Sup. Ct. J.). 
13 Id. at para. 6. 
14 Id. 
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print shop (the printer), would not provide this service and later 
attempted to justify his refusal on the basis of the Charter right to 
freedom of religion.  
The evidence before the Ontario Human Rights Board (the 
“Board”) included Mr. Brockie’s testimony as to his religious 
beliefs, including a belief that “homosexuality is detestable” and 
that “providing printing services to [LGBTQ] organizations 
would be in direct opposition to his belief.”15 The printer had 
previously done work for LGBTQ customers and for a company 
which “produces underwear marketed to the gay male 
population,” but argued that this was different since, in his view, 
the Archives were promoting the “homosexual lifestyle.”16 The 
Board decided against Mr. Brockie on the basis of the significant 
social and historical discrimination faced by LGBTQ individuals, 
the economic and psychological impact of this discrimination, and 
the fact that Canadian society had decided to protect LGBTQ 
people from discrimination. The Board found that Mr. Brockie 
would still be free to hold and practice his beliefs within his home 
and Christian community, just not by denying service to one 
group in the public marketplace. In the result, the Board made 
two orders against the printer. It ordered him and his company to 
pay damages to Mr. Brillinger and the Archives. And it ordered 
the printer in the future to provide printing services to LGBTQ 
people and to organizations that exist for their benefit.17   
On appeal, the printer claimed that this decision by the Board 
violated his right to freedom of religion under section 2(a) of the 
Charter and under section 15 as a violation of his right to be free 
from discrimination on the basis of religion.18 He argued that his 
dignity would be demeaned by being “conscripted to support a 
cause with which he disagree[d]” on the basis of a sincere 
religious belief.19 This, in his view, should confer a “defence to 
discrimination” and a “right of dissent.”20   
                                                          
15 Id. at para. 15. 
16 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
17 Id. at para. 17. 
18 Id. at para. 37. 
19 Id. at para. 19. 
20 Id. 
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The court hearing the appeal presented this case as a “conflict 
of dignities,”21 citing from the preamble to the Ontario Human 
Rights Code22 (the “Code”), a statute dedicated to promoting 
equality and prohibiting discrimination, as follows: 
(a) recognition of the inherent dignity and the 
equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family is the foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace in the world and is in accord 
with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights as proclaimed by the United Nations; 
and  
(b) it is public policy in Ontario to recognize the 
dignity and work [worth] of every person and 
to provide for equal rights and opportunities 
without discrimination that is contrary to law, 
and having as its aim the creation of a climate 
of understanding and mutual respect for the 
dignity and worth of each person so that each 
person feels a part of the community and able 
to contribute fully to the development and well 
being of the community and the Province.23 
The interesting question raised in this case asked: should there 
be an exemption for a service provider who did not refuse to 
serve LGBTQ individuals, but rather refused to produce content 
that ran directly counter to the service provider’s own beliefs? 
The court on appeal answered in the affirmative, while still 
finding against Mr. Brockie with respect to the particular facts at 
issue. The court upheld the Board’s specific order against the 
printer requiring him to pay damages for refusing to print the 
requested letterhead, envelopes and business cards. However, the 
court modified the Board’s general order that would have 
required him and his company to serve LGBTQ people and 
LGBTQ-positive organizations in the future. Instead, the court 
held that in the future, the printer would not be required “to print 
                                                          
21 Id. at para. 20. 
22 Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, pmbl (Can.). 
23 Id. 
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material of a nature which could reasonably be considered to be 
in direct conflict with the core elements of his religious beliefs or 
creed.”24 Unfortunately, the court’s formulation is unworkable, 
and it opens the door to many forms of unacceptable 
discrimination.  
 
The Issues: Who is a Person, Producing Content that Conflicts 
with One’s Beliefs, and the Slippery Slope of Exemptions 
 
As a preliminary matter, the court briefly considered the 
question of who is a “person” under the Code—for the purpose of 
bringing a discrimination claim, being the subject of a claim, or 
raising the right to religious freedom—and whether these would 
include organizations and corporations.25 The court found that the 
term “person” could include a corporation responsible for 
discriminating.26 Likewise, organizations and corporations were 
able to claim that they are the object of discrimination, as this is 
consistent with the Code’s purpose, and would allow those 
suffering from discrimination to act in association with others.27 
However, when it comes to the discriminator, the Court found 
that a corporate entity could not assert a Charter right, such as 
the right to freedom of religion.28 This finding may be helpful in 
other exemption-based belief cases. It was, however, of no 
practical import in Brockie, as Mr. Brockie was able to raise his 
own individual Charter rights. 
As to the main issue concerning the content of the requested 
service, Mr. Brockie argued that there should be a distinction 
between a refusal to provide service because of the customer’s 
human characteristic, here his sexual orientation, and a refusal 
aimed at a person engaged in the political act of promoting the 
cause of those with such characteristics. The court rejected this 
argument as specious and irrational.29 The court stated that no 
                                                          
24 Brockie, 161 O.A.C. 324 at paras. 58–59. 
25 Id. at para. 24. 
26 Id.  
27 Id. at para. 26. 
28 Id. at para. 39. 
29 Id. at para. 29. 
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authorities had been cited to support such a distinction, and 
concluded that “efforts to promote an understanding and respect 
for those possessing any specified characteristic should not be 
regarded as separate from the characteristic itself.”30 This 
conclusion is similar to the Canadian courts’ consistent rejection 
of attempts to distinguish between the identity and behaviour of 
LGBTQ people31 (as discussed below) but goes even further. The 
Court held that not only are individuals protected from 
discrimination in relation to who they are and what they do, but 
they are also protected in their endeavour to seek understanding 
and respect for themselves.  
The court then considered whether the Board, in making its 
order against the printer, had exercised its discretion in a manner 
consistent with the Charter.32 This order had not only required 
Mr. Brockie to pay damages to Mr. Brillinger and the Archives, 
but had also required that in the future, the printer would have to 
provide printing services to LGBTQ people and to organizations 
promoting their interests. All of the parties (and two of the 
intervenors) conceded that the Board’s decision infringed Mr. 
Brockie’s freedom of religion as it would force him to act in a 
manner contrary to his beliefs.33 The question at issue was, 
therefore, whether this infringement was justified under section 1 
of the Charter.34 
In its section 1 analysis, the court considered whether the 
Board’s order was rationally connected to its objective.35 The 
court distinguished between the activity in issue—the printing of 
materials such as letterhead and business cards—and a 
hypothetical situation involving the printing of materials with 
more editorial content.36 The latter materials, in the court’s view, 
                                                          
30 Id. at para. 31. 
31 Whatcott v. Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal, 2013 SCC 11, para. 
123 (Can.) (citing Trinity W. Univ. v. Coll. of Teachers (1998), 169 D.L.R. 
4th 234, para. 69 (Can. B.C. C.A.)). 
32 Brockie, 161 O.A.C. 324 at para. 36. 
33 Id. at para. 40. 
34 See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
35 Brockie, 161 O.A.C. 324 at paras. 45–56. 
36 Id. 
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could espouse “causes or activities clearly repugnant to the 
religious tenets of the printer.” Since the objective of the Code is 
to prohibit discrimination on the basis of certain characteristics, 
and to encourage equality, the court held that an order prohibiting 
more than discrimination may not be rationally connected to its 
objective, and even if so, would be unconstitutional.37   
With respect to the minimal impairment branch of the section 
1 analysis, the court found that: “[s]ervice of the public in a 
commercial service must be considered at the periphery of 
activities protected by freedom of religion,” and that limits to this 
freedom may be justified where the exercise of this freedom 
causes harm to others. Nonetheless, the court held that the 
general order was not minimally impairing, as the Board could 
have achieved its goals without intruding to the extent it did on 
Mr. Brockie’s freedom.38  
Finally, the court upheld the damages order against Mr. 
Brockie for his refusal to print the letterhead, business cards and 
envelopes at issue. However, the court modified the Board’s 
general order concerning future print jobs, creating a new 
standard and order according to which, the printer and shop 
would not be required “to print material of a nature which could 
reasonably be considered to be in direct conflict with the core 
elements of his religious beliefs or creed.”39 The court offered 
two contrasting examples to illustrate how, in its view, this would 
work: (1) if the printing project contained material that 
proselytized and promoted the “gay and lesbian lifestyle” or that 
mocked Mr. Brockie’s religious beliefs, this material may be 
found “in direct conflict with the core elements of his religious 
beliefs;”40 and (2) if the material to be printed contained a 
directory of goods and services of interest to the LGBTQ 
community, this material may be held as not “in direct conflict 
with the core elements of Mr. Brockie’s religious beliefs.”41 
                                                          
37 Id. at para. 49. 
38 Id. at paras. 51–52. 
39 Id. at para. 58. 
40 Id. at para. 56. 
41 Id. 
2014.05.05 AVIV.DOCX 5/11/2014  12:35 PM 
 (WHEN) CAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM JUSTIFY 623 
Presumably, then, the Court viewed the letterhead, envelopes and 
business cards as falling into the second category. 
The court in Brockie faced a difficult issue—how to uphold 
the duty to provide services without discrimination, while also 
recognizing the position of a service provider whose beliefs run 
counter to the material they are being asked to produce. This 
conundrum could also, in some respects, be stated in reverse 
(although the Court did not do so): what if it had been Mr. 
Brockie who had walked into the print shop of Mr. Brillinger, 
asking on behalf of Mr. Brockie’s Church to print a brochure 
containing anti-LGBTQ Biblical passages and a call-out to 
LGBTQ people to attend this Church?42 Does the right to equality 
in the public domain always require a service provider to produce 
material regardless of its content? The court’s response attempted 
to create an objective standard according to which the duty to 
provide services to the public without discrimination would 
generally be upheld, while exempting the printer if the material to 
be printed was in direct conflict with the core elements of his 
religious beliefs or creed. This standard is problematic on a 
number of levels. 
First, the idea of an objective standard to assess belief 
systems is unfeasible. In Brockie, the court’s conclusion—and the 
“objective standard” it relied upon—was that the printing of the 
letterhead, business cards and envelopes was not in conflict with 
Mr. Brockie’s core beliefs.43 This was based on a legal fiction. 
Not only was no evidence produced to support this conclusion, 
but it appeared to contradict the facts that were established in the 
case. The court cited evidence showing that Mr. Brockie had 
been willing to do business with LGBTQ people, as well as with 
                                                          
42 If the discrimination had been against a church, the analysis would be 
different. As discussed supra Part I, an analysis concerning discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation must be viewed in light of its current and 
historical contexts. Discrimination on the basis of religion and creed will raise 
its own issues, for example: whether creed includes nonreligious beliefs based 
on a person’s conscience; and whether disapproval of certain religious views 
or practices ought to be considered discrimination. These issues are beyond the 
scope of this Article.  
43 See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text. 
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a company whose underwear was marketed towards gay men. 
Mr. Brockie’s refusal to do business with Mr. Brillinger, then, 
appeared to have been based precisely on the content of the 
materials. Given that Mr. Brockie chose to turn down business, 
and potentially alienate Mr. Brillinger, the Gay and Lesbian 
Archives, and possibly other customers as a result of his refusal, 
it seems at least plausible, if not likely, that Mr. Brockie refused 
to print the material because it was in direct conflict with his core 
beliefs. The court’s “objective” standard is not helpful in 
clarifying this situation.  
Second, belief and practice are highly personal, a principle 
well established by the Canadian courts.44 While Canadian courts 
do utilize certain objective standards with respect to religious 
beliefs—such as whether the infringement of these beliefs is 
trivial or insubstantial45—it should be difficult for a court in some 
circumstances to insert an “objective” standard without 
supporting evidence to establish that a belief is not a core 
element. This is especially true if a savvy service provider has 
testified that avoiding the promotion of certain behaviours or 
ideas is central to their religious and spiritual integrity. 
Supporting evidence on whether or not a particular element or 
belief is important to a person may come in many forms, such as 
the individual’s testimony as to what impact would result from a 
rights violation, and evidence concerning the consistency of their 
behaviour, though these examples raise their own challenges.  
Third, the court’s “objective” standard—that would exempt a 
service provider from the duty to provide service without 
discrimination if the product is in direct conflict with the core 
elements of their religious beliefs—could also create a slippery 
slope leading to countless additional denials of service. This point 
was effectively made by the concurrence in Marriage 
Commissioners.46 In the context of discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation, belief-based exemptions could be claimed by a 
                                                          
44 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (Can.). 
45 E.g., Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v. Alberta, 2009 SCC 37, 
para. 32 (Can.) (citing Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R.). 
46 See infra Part II.D for further discussion. 
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wedding planner asked to organize a same-sex wedding, or 
anyone associated with the wedding industry from the caterer to 
the receptionist working for the dress-maker. An architect asked 
to design a family home or bedroom could refuse, as could 
anyone else in the building industry. An individual involved in 
service or hospitality, such as a room service waiter or a 
concierge asked for the location of a romantic restaurant might 
feel the same urge to refuse. And the same may be said for any 
person providing services to support the couple or family’s life as 
a couple or family.  
Indeed, the logic behind the court’s examples, suggesting that 
Mr. Brockie may not refuse to print neutral, LGBTQ material, 
but may refuse to print material that promotes the “gay and 
lesbian lifestyle,”47 could justify many refusals as described in the 
above paragraph, all of which involve the service provider 
arguably promoting or contributing to said “lifestyle.” In 
addition, the court’s attempted distinction between LGBTQ value-
neutral content and LGBTQ promotional material bears a striking 
resemblance to the distinction that the court had earlier rejected 
between discrimination on the basis of sexual identity and 
discrimination on the basis of sexual behaviour.48  
A more useful standard may nonetheless be derived from one 
of the examples provided by the court. The court had suggested 
that it may be permissible to exempt Mr. Brockie if the brochure 
mocked his religious beliefs.49 Given the danger of creating a 
slippery slope and overly broad exemptions, this Article would 
narrow the court’s example still further and consider permitting 
an exemption for a service provider who refuses to produce 
material that directly fosters hate towards the service provider 
(and/or towards a group protected under the antidiscrimination 
laws). Thus, if Mr. Brillinger had been the service provider and 
had refused to print the above-mentioned hypothetical brochure 
containing anti-LGBTQ Biblical passages, he might have been 
justified in this refusal. Likewise, Mr. Brockie might be justified 
                                                          
47 See supra note 35–41 and accompanying text. 
48 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
49 Brockie, 161 O.A.C. 324, at para. 31. 
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if he refused to print a brochure stating, for example, that any 
church not recognizing LGBTQ rights is Satanic. 
It should be noted that the issue of refusals on the basis of 
content is limited in scope. Human rights laws prohibit only 
discrimination on the basis of particular grounds (such as race, 
gender, creed, and sexual orientation). In all other contexts, a 
service provider is free to refuse to produce material that has a 
message with which they disagree, as long as the message is not a 
proxy for the protected group.   
To conclude, the facts in Brockie present a useful basis for 
considering discriminatory refusals involving content that violates 
a service provider’s beliefs. While the Court’s attempt to define 
an objective standard based on the core beliefs of the service 
provider is not helpful, not feasible, and in fact demonstrates how 
such standards could lead to a multitude of exemptions that would 
undermine the purpose of the human rights laws, a narrowed 
solution may exist for those situations in which a service provider 
is asked to produce material that directly fosters hate towards the 
service provider (and/or towards a group protected under the 
antidiscrimination laws).  
 
B. Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36:50 Can a 
School Board Refuse to Allow into its Classrooms Books 
Depicting Same-Sex Parents? 
 
Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36 is one of the 
most recent and relevant decisions from the Supreme Court of 
Canada dealing with discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation in the provision of services, addressing both freedom 
of religion and LGBTQ rights. Chamberlain involved a 
kindergarten teacher who asked the local school board to approve 
three books as supplementary learning resources for use in 
teaching the family life education curriculum.51 The books—
Asha’s Mums, Belinda’s Bouquet, and One Dad, Two Dads, 
Brown Dad, Blue Dads—depicted families with same-sex 
                                                          
50 4 S.C.R. 710 (2002) (Can.). 
51 Id. at para. 44. 
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parents.52 The school board responded by passing a resolution 
refusing to allow these books into the schools.53 As a result of the 
board’s resolution, in some schools in the district, certain 
resources were removed, including library books, posters, and 
pamphlets.54 
While Chamberlain did not involve a private actor in the role 
of service provider, it concerns discrimination in the provision of 
“services.” Those being discriminated against or otherwise 
negatively impacted may have included: children, parents, 
teachers, and the general community. As to the service-provider, 
while the discriminating body in this case was an elected school 
board, its decision was based in large part on the views of 
“parents” in the community who objected to the books, and a 
concern that having the books at school would create controversy 
in the children’s homes because of their parents’ views.  
The majority rejected the school board’s resolution as 
unreasonable for having violated the board’s obligations under its 
governing statute and the relevant regulation, which should have 
included secularism, nonsectarianism, tolerance, and respect for 
diversity. By resolving the case on the basis of administrative law 
principles in this manner, the majority declared it unnecessary to 
address Charter issues.55 It was the dissent who raised the 
difficult questions about the right to dissent and disapprove, and 
who demonstrated the clash between freedom of religion and 
equality and their underlying values in this case.56 A complete 
analysis and response to the dissent should address these issues 
through an expanded understanding of secularism and a 
contextual balancing of the interests at stake, and then conclude, 
as the majority did, that the school board’s decision to ban the 
books was impermissible.  
 
  
                                                          
52 Id. at para. 50. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at para. 46. 
55  Id. at para. 76. 
56  See id. at paras. 146–52. 
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1. The Majority: Diversity, the Meaning of Secularism, and 
Tolerance vs. Freedom of Religion 
 
The majority opinion, delivered by Chief Justice McLachlin, 
decided against the school board on the basis of administrative 
law, thus attempting to avoid the difficult issues by avoiding a 
Charter analysis.57 However, the dissent tackled these issues 
head-on, often in very problematic ways, as will be discussed.58 
Perhaps in response to this, the majority relied on the relevant 
administrative law to take strong stands on diversity, secularism, 
and tolerance:59 It made a compelling case for respecting 
diversity.60 It considered the meaning of secularism,61 whether 
religious views may be included in public debate, and how these 
views may and may not be used in decision-making.62 And the 
majority responded to the dissent’s position on cognitive 
dissonance—the experience of parents whose children may be 
forced to learn values contradictory to those at home.63  
On the issues of secularism and tolerance, the majority held 
that these were part of the school board’s statutory obligations 
which the board had failed to meet: 
The Board’s first error was to violate the principles 
of secularism and tolerance in [section] 76 of the 
School Act. Instead of proceeding on the basis of 
respect for all types of families, the Superintendent 
and the Board proceeded on an exclusionary 
philosophy. They acted on the concern of certain 
parents about the morality of same-sex 
                                                          
57 The majority concluded that the school board’s decision must fail 
because the board acted outside its statutory mandate by failing to apply both 
statutory criteria and the board’s own procedures. Id. at para 59. 
58 Id. at paras. 75–187 (Gonthier, J., dissenting); see also infra Part II.E. 
59 Chamberlain, 4 S.C.R. 710 at para. 33 (majority opinion). 
60 Id. at para. 49. 
61 Id. at para. 33. 
62 Id. at para. 59. 
63 Id. at paras. 62–66. The majority also found that the school board had 
failed to follow its regulation, and that the criteria it relied on were the wrong 
ones. Id. at para. 71. 
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relationships, without considering the interest of 
same-sex parented families and children who 
belong to them in receiving equal recognition and 
respect in the school system.64 
Similarly, the majority noted the requirement that the board 
recognize diverse communities within the school district and 
approach the needs of each with “respect and tolerance.”65 The 
majority found that the board had not considered families with 
same-sex parents and had relied instead on the views of a 
particular group who opposed any depiction of same-sex 
relationships.66 
The recognition that there may be different kinds of families 
in the school—some who oppose the book, some with same-sex 
parents, some with an LGBTQ-positive approach—is so obvious 
it should not need to be stated.67 But as will be discussed below, 
this was a point the dissent missed almost entirely.68  
The majority’s administrative law analysis also involved a 
discussion about secularism and freedom of religion, and whether 
the school board was permitted to take into account the views of 
parents who objected to the books on the basis of religious 
concerns. The majority concluded that the principle of secularism 
required by the law did not preclude parents from objecting to the 
books on the basis of religious considerations.69  What secularism 
did require, they found, was that the religious views of one part 
of the community could not be used to exclude minority voices, 
that educational decisions and policies must respect the 
“multiplicity of religious and moral views”70 held by parents and 
families in the community, and that the board’s decision must be 
reasonable in the context of the statutory scheme. In his 
concurring opinion, Justice LeBel agreed with the majority’s 
                                                          
64 Id. at para. 58. 
65 Id. at para. 25. 
66 Id. at para 71. 
67 There will also be families with LGBTQ children and members of the 
community with a deeply held, fundamental belief in equality. 
68 See discussion infra Part II.E. 
69 Chamberlain, 4 S.C.R. 710 at para. 59. 
70 Id. 
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conclusion that parents’ decisions can be based on religious or 
other views.71 However, for Justice LeBel¸ the idea of secularism 
would rule out “policy based on beliefs that are intolerant of 
others . . . whether those beliefs are religious, moral or 
philosophical.”72 Translating such beliefs into policy is 
prohibited, he continued, to the extent that these beliefs deny the 
validity of other points of view: 
There is no difficulty in reconciling the School 
Act’s commitment to secularism with freedom of 
religion. Freedom of religion is not diminished, 
but is safeguarded, by the state’s abstention from 
favouring or promoting any specific religious creed 
. . . . Disagreement with the practices and beliefs 
of others, while certainly permissible and perhaps 
inevitable in a pluralist society, does not justify 
denying others the opportunity for their views to 
be represented, or refusing to acknowledge their 
existence.73 
Accordingly, the majority seemed to imply what the 
concurrence stated explicitly—that the constitutional right to 
freedom of religion, coupled with the board’s statutory duty to 
uphold the principle of secularism, required that there be room 
for all manner of belief and opinion. Given the inevitable 
conflicts that may arise between two or more belief systems, 
intolerance would not be tolerated. It would be interesting to 
consider expanding the meaning of secularism still further, such 
that in a situation involving a fundamental rights violation, 
community standards (and prejudices) could not prevail over 
evidence-based decision making. 
Another interesting aspect of the majority opinion was its 
response to the school board’s reliance on the concept of 
“cognitive dissonance”74 in order to exclude the books. The board 
had used this term to mean that children should not be exposed to 
                                                          
71 Id. at para. 188 (Lebel, J., concurring). 
72 Id. at para. 210. 
73 Id. at paras. 211–12. 
74 Id. at para. 64 (majority opinion). 
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ideas with which their parents disagreed.75 The majority found 
this argument antithetical to the curriculum’s objective of 
promoting tolerance and an understanding of all types of families. 
The majority provided a number of examples of differences 
(based on religion or morals) that may be found in a diverse 
community—including differences in what classmates were 
permitted to eat or wear or how they behaved—and stated:  
[S]uch dissonance is neither avoidable nor noxious. 
Children encounter it every day in the public 
school system as members of a diverse student 
body . . . . The cognitive dissonance that results 
from such encounters is simply a part of living in a 
diverse society. It is also a part of growing up. 
Through such experiences, children come to 
realize that not all of their values are shared by 
others. Exposure to some cognitive dissonance is 
arguably necessary if children are to be taught 
what tolerance itself involves . . . . When we ask 
people to be tolerant of others, we do not ask them 
to abandon their personal convictions. We merely 
ask them to respect the rights, values and ways of 
being of those who may not share those 
convictions. The belief that others are entitled to 
equal respect depends, not on the belief that their 
values are right, but on the belief that they have a 
claim to equal respect regardless of whether they 
are right. Learning about tolerance is therefore 
learning that other people’s entitlement to respect 
from us does not depend on whether their views 
accord with our own. Children cannot learn this 
unless they are exposed to views that differ from 
those they are taught at home.76  
The emphasis on tolerance is critical in a multicultural 
society, and it is true that members of this society—children and 
adults—will be exposed to diverse customs, families, and values. 
                                                          
75 Id. at para. 58.  
76 Id. at paras. 65–66. 
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However, the majority’s analysis would have been far better if it 
had reached this conclusion without minimizing the genuine harm 
that may have been suffered by some parents who objected to the 
books and whose children may have been in the classrooms at 
issue. Once images have been viewed, words read, or ideas 
shared among the children, they cannot be unviewed and 
unlearned. Many parents would recoil at the thought of their 
children being coercively taught values that directly contravene 
their own—whether such values espouse militarism, sexism, or a 
particular telling of history. Indeed, as will be discussed, such 
coercion may amount to a violation of the parents’ dignity. And 
while the possibility of private school or home-schooling77 may 
allow certain parents to opt out of the public system, such an 
option is beyond the means of many families due to the cost of 
private school and the financial needs of families with two 
working parents. Leaving the public school system could also 
result in a loss of other benefits, such as academic standards, 
social and community engagement, and sports and art programs. 
These benefits should, of course, also be available to LGBTQ 
students, parents, teachers, and equality seekers.  Therefore, on 
balance, openness, inclusion, and diversity would need to prevail.  
To conclude, while the majority reached the correct 
conclusion, it would have been preferable if it had done so with 
greater sensitivity to the religious freedom of the objecting 
parents.  Such sensitivity would have required the majority to 
directly engage the real rights infringement faced by these parents 
and the difficult issues presented by the dissent.  The resulting 
discussion would have more accurately depicted the interests at 
stake, and would have been richer as a result.  
 
2. The Dissent: Heterosexist Assumptions, Sincere 
Discriminatory Beliefs, and Dignity 
 
The dissenting opinion, delivered by Justice Gonthier, was 
indeed sensitive to the harms suffered by objecting parents. As 
such, the dissent raised the difficult issues in this case concerning 
                                                          
77 Id. at para. 30. 
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freedom of religion, freedom of conscience, equality, and 
freedom of expression; the tension when a dissenting opinion is 
discriminatory; and the collision of dignities between those of 
differing views.78 In other respects, however, the dissenting 
opinion should serve as a cautionary tale of how not to adjudicate 
cases involving discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 
With respect, significant parts of this opinion were based on 
anachronistic ideas and a heteronormative perspective that quite 
simply failed to recognize the claims and, in some cases, the 
existence of LGBTQ children, parents, and educators, as well as 
other equality seekers in the community. 
First, the dissent relied on the distinction (already then 
discredited in the case law) between the right to equality of all 
persons, which it said was “consonant with their inherent human 
dignity,” and the “conduct of persons,” which it implied may not 
be deserving of equal respect, concern, and consideration.79 The 
sexual orientation/sexual behaviour distinction (alternatively 
referred to as the status/conduct or identity/practice distinction) is 
one that recurs throughout the belief-based exemption cases. 
Canadian tribunals and courts have consistently rejected this 
distinction when it comes to LGBTQ rights, affirming instead 
that: “Human rights law states that certain practices cannot be 
separated from identity, such that condemnation of the practice is 
a condemnation of the person.”80  
Second, the dissenting opinion attempted to distinguish 
between the rights of “homosexual persons” to be free from 
discrimination and “parental rights to make the decisions they 
deem necessary to ensure the well-being and moral education of 
their children.”81 In other words, the dissent’s analysis proceeded 
as if there were two distinct categories: (1) parents who have a 
right to educate their children, raise them in their faith, and 
                                                          
78 Id. at paras. 75–187 (Gonthier, J., dissenting). 
79 Id. at para. 77. 
80  Whatcott v. Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal, 2013 SCC 11, 
para. 123 (Can.) (citing Trinity W. Univ. v. Coll. of Teachers (1998), 169 
D.L.R. 4th 234, para. 69 (Can. B.C. C.A.)). 
81 Chamberlain, 4 S.C.R. 710, at para. 79 (Gonthier J., dissenting). 
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decide their “best interests;”82 and (2) “homosexual persons” 
seeking the inclusion of LGBTQ-positive materials in schools.83 
The values and rights of LGBTQ or LGBTQ-positive parents or 
students were largely excluded from the analysis and did not 
seem to play a significant role in the dissenting opinion’s hetero-
normative worldview.84  
Third, unfortunately and with respect, things went from bad 
to worse when the dissent tried to determine whether the books 
under discussion were about nondiscrimination, or whether they 
contained LGBTQ-positive messaging.85 The low point in a less-
than-flawless opinion occurred when the dissenting judges, two 
members of the Supreme Court of Canada, expressed this 
distinction with no apparent shame or apology as follows: 
The experts basically present two competing views 
of these Three Books. One view is that they are 
simply books aimed at the dominant theme of 
nondiscrimination, with the presence of parents in 
a same-sex relationship simply being tangential 
context. The books are therefore about acceptance. 
The other view is that regardless of the valid and 
present acceptance theme, a different message is 
also present: parents in same-sex relationships are 
being portrayed as “normal” by being portrayed in 
a positive sense.86 
There is good reason to take issue with the above aspects of 
the dissenting opinion. Nonetheless, the dissent should be 
credited with bringing to the surface one of the fundamental 
                                                          
82 Id. at para. 103. 
83 Id. at para. 125. 
84 There are a few small references in the dissent to the possibility that 
LGBTQ people might have children; however, these are only raised, it seems, 
as theoretical constructs, which seem to have no connection with the “parents” 
who appear far more frequently throughout the opinion, and who feature in the 
dissent’s reasoning as those who have a right to decide what is best for their 
children. Id. at paras. 120, 147. 
85 This, in itself, is a questionable distinction. 
86  Chamberlain, 4 S.C.R. 710 at para. 174 (Gonthier, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
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challenges in this case: in a liberal, pluralistic society, how 
should the right to equality interact with dissenting beliefs. The 
dissent expressed this challenge as follows:  
It is a feeble notion of pluralism that transforms 
“tolerance” into “mandated approval or 
acceptance.” In my view, the inherent dignity of 
the individual not only survives such moral 
disapproval, but to insist on the alternative risks 
treating another person in a manner inconsistent 
with their human dignity: there is a potential for a 
collision of dignities. Surely a person’s [section] 
2(a) or [section] 2(b) Charter right to hold beliefs 
which disapprove of the conduct of others cannot 
be obliterated by another person’s [section] 15 
rights, just like a person’s [section] 15 rights 
cannot be trumped by [section] 2(a) or 2(b) rights. 
In such cases, there is a need for reasonable 
accommodation or balancing.87 
There are a number of interesting threads in this reasoning. 
First, there is the assertion that people can and must be able to 
hold a diversity of views to agree with, but also to disapprove of 
each other’s conduct. For this reason, the dissent asserted, 
equality cannot simply trump freedom of religion and 
conscience—there will be a need for balancing.88 Second, it is not 
clear if the dissenting judges required that only beliefs based on 
religion must be protected. For the dissenting judges, it may have 
been that one person disapproving of another’s conduct 
constituted a protected belief. They did not explicitly require that 
such beliefs be religiously grounded. The third thread is the idea 
that dignity may in some cases be offended when one’s freedom 
of religion is violated. 
While the reasoning in these threads is correct, they fail to 
paint a full picture, and deserve further attention. With respect to 
the first thread, protections for dissenting and pluralistic views 
are critical. It is true that such views may protect offensive 
                                                          
87 Id. at para. 132. 
88 Id. at paras. 132–35. 
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beliefs such as those of the objecting parents, but they have also 
protected minority and marginalized views—including LGBTQ-
positive positions. However, what was missing from the dissent’s 
analysis was the deeply inequitable context in which these two 
dissenting views were competing. At the time of the Chamberlain 
challenge, majoritarian privilege rested with the community that 
banned the books and accepted anti-LGBTQ discrimination. In 
addition, in the conflict between the two dissenting views, one 
(the anti-LGBTQ perspective) was aimed at singling out, 
excluding, and removing from the classroom any resources that 
mentioned the other (LGBTQ parents).  
With regard to the second thread concerning the basis of the 
beliefs, it is important that deeply held fundamental beliefs of 
conscience be respected and protected. In the Canadian 
Constitution, freedom of conscience is protected under the 
Charter alongside freedom of religion.89 Such freedom of 
conscience may protect a person’s right to hold anti-LGBTQ 
beliefs even if not based on a religious worldview, though the 
content of such beliefs may lose validity or credibility in the 
public perception, absent a religious connection. Indeed, 
discriminatory acts and beliefs that lack the sanction of a religious 
worldview may better demonstrate the intolerable nature of such 
discrimination. However, freedom of conscience should also 
protect a person’s right to the belief that all people are born equal 
in dignity and rights. This belief can and frequently is grounded 
in religious roots. It could also be based on secular humanism or 
other deeply held convictions. The practical result, with respect 
to the belief-based exemption cases, is that if a person 
experiences discrimination on the basis of their sexual 
orientation, it is not just their equality rights that have been 
violated. There may well also have been a violation of their and 
others’ deeply held fundamental belief in equality and dignity. In 
Chamberlain, for example, parents with deeply held beliefs in the 
equality of all people may have felt that the school board’s ban 
                                                          
89 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 2(a) (U.K.). 
See also supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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violated their freedom of conscience or religion and caused 
cognitive dissonance in their homes. The same may be said of 
Mr. Brillinger when he was denied printing services, or any 
person for whom equality is a fundamental value, when forced to 
participate in a discriminatory situation, whether the 
discrimination is against themselves or others. For this reason, 
invoking freedom of religion and conscience may not be 
determinative in resolving such cases. 
Finally, on the issue of dignity, the dissent provided an 
important reminder that a violation of religious freedom could 
offend one’s dignity.90 “Dignity” is most commonly associated 
with equality rights, and discrimination will in many cases result 
in injury to a person’s dignity. What the dissent establishes is that 
dignity is not just the purview of equality. If, for example, one is 
coerced to act against one’s deeply held fundamental beliefs, such 
as being forced to convert to another religion, or perhaps to 
violate one’s laws of purity, or as here, to have one’s children 
taught to believe in a value that contradicts one’s own beliefs, 
such coercion could amount to a violation of dignity. In the 
result, resort to the notion of “dignity” could apply to equality or 
freedom of religion, and as such, this concept may also not be 
determinative in resolving tensions between these rights in the 
belief-based exemption cases. A “collision of dignities,” as 
mentioned in the dissent, may require another form of 
resolution.91 
In conclusion, the court may have done well to rely on an 
expanded understanding of secularism. Given a situation in which 
fundamental rights were at stake, the decision about allowing 
resources into the classroom should perhaps have been based on 
evidence as to the material’s educational value, ability to engage, 
age appropriateness, or harmfulness. A proportionality analysis 
should require that parents’ objections on the basis of their 
religious freedom would need to be weighed in context against 
the impact on LGBTQ parents, children, teachers, and others that 
would be singled out for exclusion, and the fact that all children 
                                                          
90 Chamberlain, 4 S.C.R. 710 at para. 134 (Gonthier, J., dissenting). 
91 Id. at para. 132. 
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in the relevant grades would be deprived of exposure to the 
diversity at issue. While the dissent raised compelling questions 
about a collision of dignities and the right to disapprove and 
dissent, on balance in this case, the objecting parents seeking to 
single out a group for discrimination and exclusion in a public 
school should not be able to rely on rights such as freedom of 
religion and equality, whose very purpose is to avoid 
discrimination and exclusion.  
 
C. Eadie v. Riverbend Bed & Breakfast:92 Can Bed and 
Breakfast Owners Rely on Their Religious Convictions to 
Deny a Room to a Gay Couple? 
 
The case of Eadie v. Riverbend Bed & Breakfast involved a 
couple (the “complainants”) who booked a room at the Riverbend 
Bed and Breakfast (the “Riverbend”).93 When the Riverbend 
owners (the “owners”) learned that the complainants were gay, 
they cancelled the reservation.94 The complainants filed a human 
rights complaint with the British Columbia Human Rights 
Tribunal (“Tribunal”), on the basis of section 8 of the British 
Columbia Human Rights Code (the “B.C. Code”).95 The owners 
denied that their conduct was discriminatory, arguing that the 
cancellation was justified on the basis of their constitutionally 
                                                          
92 2012 BCHRT 247 (Can.). 
93 Id. at para 1. 
94 Id. at para. 2. 
95 The B.C. Code is legislation aimed at prohibiting discrimination in such 
areas as employment, housing, and the provision of services, absent a bona 
fide and reasonable justification for the discrimination. Id. at para. 95 (quoting 
British Columbia Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, § 8(1)). 
Section 8(1) of the British Columbia Human Rights Code provides as follows: 
A person must not, without a bona fide and reasonable 
justification, 
(a) deny to a person or class of persons any accommodation, 
service or facility customarily available to the public, or 
(b) discriminate against a person or class of persons 
regarding any accommodation, service or facility customarily 
available to the public . . . . 
British Columbia Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, § 8(1). 
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protected right to freedom of religion.96  
The Tribunal found for the complainants, holding that the 
owners had refused to provide service because of the 
complainants’ sexual orientation, that the owners had not proven 
a bona fide and reasonable justification for the discrimination, 
and could not rely on any of the other exemptions in the B.C. 
Code. Some of the remedies included: a declaration that the 
owners’ conduct was discriminatory, an order for the owners to 
cease and desist from this and similar conduct, and an order that 
the owners pay each complainant a modest sum for the indignity 
and humiliation each had suffered.97 Although the Eadie Tribunal 
reached the correct result, its analysis was strained and flawed. 
Based as it was on contemporary human rights 
(antidiscrimination) law, it did not use the appropriate tools to 
adequately address a conflict of rights.  
The Tribunal’s analysis began well, carefully evaluating 
evidence to establish the context, including the beliefs of the 
owners and the harms caused to the complainants resulting from 
the discrimination.98 The Tribunal also properly considered and 
rejected the sexual identity/behaviour distinction and reached the 
correct conclusion that the complainants had made out a prima 
facie case of discrimination.99 The challenges in this case arose in 
the next phase of the analysis, when the Tribunal followed the 
prescribed steps to evaluate whether the owners had a bona fide 
and reasonable justification (“BFRJ”) for their discriminatory 
conduct.100 The BFRJ test proved unhelpful in resolving the 
issues, and did not allow for nuance or a balancing of the 
conflicting rights. In its BFRJ analysis, the Tribunal defined the 
                                                          
96 Eadie, 2012 BCHRT 247 at para. 2. The Tribunal did not have 
jurisdiction over constitutional questions per se.  However the question of 
equality versus freedom of religion was properly before the Tribunal, as it had 
jurisdiction to interpret and apply the antidiscrimination provisions of the B.C. 
Code using normal principles of statutory interpretation, including an 
interpretation informed by Charter values. 
97 Id. at para. 173. 
98 Id. at paras. 1–95. 
99 Id. at paras. 96–115. 
100 Id. at para. 116. 
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function of the service provider in an absolutist manner that 
effectively determined the outcome of the complaint;101 applied a 
spectrum analysis to evaluate the religiosity of the service 
provider,102 and in this as well, came to a conclusion lacking in 
nuance; and conducted a superficial analysis of two other 
statutory exemptions that it found to be inapplicable to the 
complaint.103 A proportionality analysis of the kind employed in 
constitutional cases under section 1 of the Charter would have 
been more direct in raising and assessing the relevant issues, and 
it would have allowed for the kinds of nuance and balancing 
necessary in a conflict of rights situation. 
 
1. Establishing Prima Facie Discrimination; Evidence of 
Religious Beliefs and the Impact of Discrimination; and Sexual 
Orientation vs. Sexual Behaviour 
 
The decision in Eadie began with the Tribunal taking the time 
to consider evidence concerning not only the events that 
occurred, but also the beliefs of the owners and the impact of the 
events on the complainants.104 All of these were important for an 
in-depth contextual analysis. The owners Susan Molnar and Les 
Molnar were a religious couple, active members of a Church, 
who hosted religious activities in their home which was also the 
Riverbend bed and breakfast.105 The Riverbend itself had no 
direct connection to the Church.106 The owners’ beliefs about sex 
and sin, the role of their home religiously, and their belief in God 
were all recounted by the Tribunal.107 These included a belief that 
all sex outside of a committed, heterosexual marriage is a sin, 
and that the owners are responsible for what takes place in their 
home.108  
                                                          
101 Eadie, 2012 BCHRT 247 at para. 144. 
102 Id. at para. 125. 
103 Id. at paras. 125–26. 
104 Id. at paras. 1–80. 
105 Id. at paras. 11–17. 
106 Id. at para. 21. 
107 Id. at paras. 11–17. 
108 Id. at paras. 15–17. 
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The complainants Shaun Eadie and Brian Thomas were a gay 
couple.109 The Tribunal took the time to describe the emotional 
and psychological impact of the cancellation on the complainants. 
This included a description of the bullying, demeaning conduct, 
and bigotry the complainants had faced since childhood, and how 
the incident with the Riverbend caused one complainant to 
“return” to a childhood in which he was shunned and excluded.  
The Tribunal described how the one complainant had since 
established his self-confidence, but the refusal shocked and 
devastated him. The Tribunal also detailed how angry, emotional, 
and disturbed both complainants felt as a result of the 
cancellation, and how they had experienced this as an affront to 
their dignity.110  
In this case—as in many belief-based exemption cases—there 
was an attempt by the owners to distinguish between sexual 
behaviour and sexual orientation. Mr. Molnar argued that his 
concern was with sexual conduct in his home and therefore he 
might have considered an “amicable” arrangement, such as 
providing two rooms and receiving assurances from the 
complainants that they would do nothing offensive to the owners’ 
beliefs (i.e. no sexual conduct).111 The Tribunal in Eadie rejected 
this orientation/conduct distinction both as a matter of fact112 and 
of law. In support of the latter conclusion, the Tribunal cited, 
among others, the 2005 B.C. Human Rights Tribunal decision of 
Hayes v. Barker:113 
[T]he ground of sexual orientation is not 
exclusively status or identity based, but also 
protects against discrimination on the basis of 
behaviours engaged in as a result of a person’s 
orientation. If it were otherwise, the prohibition on 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
would offer scant protection indeed. Such an 
                                                          
109 Id. at para. 1. 
110 Id. at paras. 77–80. 
111 Id. at para. 58. 
112 The Tribunal found that Mr. Molnar had cancelled the complainants’ 
reservation because they were a gay couple. Id. at para. 115. 
113 2005 BCHRT 590 (Can.). 
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interpretation would prohibit a person from being 
fired for “being” gay, while doing nothing to 
prohibit a gay man being fired for having sex with 
his male partner . . . .114 
The Tribunal also rejected the owners’ hypothetical 
“amicable” arrangement on the grounds that the complainants 
should not be required to make assurances in order to access a 
service.115 One of the complainants expressed his concerns with 
such an arrangement as follows: “[I]t would have been the same 
as asking a person of colour to enter from a separate door.”116  
In conclusion, the Tribunal was satisfied that the complainants 
had made out the first part of the complaint, having established a 
prima facie case of discrimination.117 It was now open to the 
owners, under the B.C. Code, to attempt to prove a bona fide and 
reasonable justification for the discrimination.118 The owners tried 
to do so on the basis of their religious beliefs.119  
 
2.  The Bona Fide and Reasonable Justification Defence; 
Defining the Service; the Spectrum Analysis; Intimacy of the 
Service; and a Balancing Test 
 
Both the complainants and the owners in Eadie relied on a 
2005 B.C. Human Rights Tribunal belief-based exemption case 
called Smith v. Knights of Columbus,120 which also focused on 
the BFRJ analysis. The Knights of Columbus was a Catholic 
                                                          
114 Eadie, 2012 BCHRT 247 at para. 114 (citing Hayes, 2005 BCHRT 
590, at para. 22). 
115 Id. at para. 144. 
116 Id. at para. 66. 
117 Id. at para. 115. 
118 The elements of a bona fide and reasonable justification are: (1) the 
respondents adopted a standard, rule, or goal that is rationally connected to the 
function; (2) they adopted the rule in good faith, in the belief that it was 
necessary to the fulfillment of the purpose or goal; and (3) the standard was 
reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose or goal, in that the 
respondents could not accommodate the individual without incurring undue 
hardship. Id. at paras. 116–17.  
119 Id. at paras. 128–30. 
120 2005 BCHRT 544 (Can.). 
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men’s organization that rented out a Church-owned and Church-
affiliated banquet hall to Parish church groups, as well as to the 
general public. While there were no restrictions publicized, the 
Parish priest had the final word on which activities were 
permissible in the hall.121 In Knights, a couple had rented the hall 
for their wedding reception, but when the organization learned 
that the rental was for a reception following a same-sex wedding 
contrary to the Church’s teachings, they cancelled the 
reservation.122  
The Knights decision is notable for certain problematic 
aspects of its analysis. The Tribunal in Knights did declare, 
correctly, that “while everyone is entitled to hold and manifest 
their own sincerely held religious beliefs and to declare those 
beliefs, . . . [this] right is not absolute.”123 In effect, however, the 
reasoning of the Knights Tribunal provided near-absolute 
protection for the organization’s freedom of religion in the public 
domain.  
Following the prescribed steps for a BFRJ analysis,124 the 
Knights Tribunal had to determine certain concepts to be applied 
in the test, namely: the rule or standard that led to the prima facie 
discrimination; and the function of the service at issue. The 
Knights Tribunal made these determinations in a manner that 
incorporated religious belief, effectively deciding the outcome of 
the analysis through these determinations.125 The Knights 
Tribunal determined that the rule adopted by the Knights 
organization was: the organization does not rent out the hall for 
purposes “contrary to its core [Catholic] beliefs.”126 The function 
of the service was determined to be: renting the hall in ways that 
would not undermine the organization’s relationship with the 
Catholic Church or conflict with the beliefs of the members of the 
organization.127 Given that both the rule that led to the denial of 
                                                          
121 Id. paras. 1, 6. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at para. 93. 
124 See supra note 116  
125 Knights of Columbus, 2005 BCHRT 544 at paras. 108–09. 
126 Id. at para. 108 (emphasis added). 
127 Id. at para. 88. 
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service and the function of the service were defined in connection 
with the beliefs of the Church and/or of the organization, it is no 
wonder that the Knights Tribunal concluded that this rule was 
rationally connected to this function.128   
As to the question of whether the Knights could have 
accommodated the complainants without undue hardship,129 the 
Tribunal conducted a “spectrum analysis” to evaluate where the 
case fell on the spectrum between upholding the service 
providers’ freedom of religion, and the equality rights of the 
complainants. The Tribunal held that the further the act of prima 
facie discrimination from the service provider’s core religious 
beliefs, the less it would be likely to be justified.  The Tribunal 
found, further, that in the case at bar, the hall fell somewhere on 
the continuum between a parish church, that would not have been 
required to act against its religious beliefs, and a purely 
commercial space with no religious affiliation, in which case the 
complainants would have been entitled to rent the space. 
Interestingly, the Knights Tribunal referred to Brockie as an 
example of just such a commercial enterprise.130 The Tribunal 
concluded that:  
a person, with a sincerely held religious belief 
cannot be compelled to act in a manner that 
conflict[s] with that belief, even if that act is in the 
public domain . . . . [T]he Knights are entitled to 
this constitutional protection and therefore cannot 
be compelled to act in a manner that is contrary to 
their core religious beliefs.131 
Even though the respondents were not being asked to 
participate in the solemnization of a same-sex marriage, the 
Tribunal decided, renting the hall for its celebration would have 
required the organization to indirectly condone the celebration of 
a same-sex marriage, contrary to the members’ core religious 
                                                          
128 Id. at para. 89. 
129 Id. at paras 91–92. 
130 Id. at paras. 106–10. 
131 Id. at para. 113 (emphasis added).  
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beliefs.132 This absolutist position, whereby the organization’s 
core beliefs should not be violated, may be more extreme than the 
problematic “objective” standard adopted by the Court in 
Brockie.133  
Despite this, the Knights Tribunal found for the complainants 
on the narrow ground that the Knights had not accommodated the 
complainants in a manner that did not violate the respondents’ 
beliefs.  Such accommodation could have included, according to 
the Tribunal: meeting with the complainants, explaining the 
situation to them, formally apologizing, reimbursing them 
immediately, and possibly offering them assistance to find 
another venue.134  
The BFRJ analysis in Knights raises a number of difficulties, 
demonstrating certain analytical positions that should be avoided 
in belief-based exemption cases. First, in Knights, the religious 
nature of the organization appears to have trumped other factors, 
such as the extremely tenuous connection between the service 
provider and the service. In contrast, for example, to Mr. 
Brockie the printer, who presumably would have had to be 
personally involved to some extent in producing the requested 
material, the organization in Knights did not appear to have had a 
connection to the event other than through the rather impersonal 
act of renting out the hall; and even that was for the wedding 
reception, not the ceremony itself. Indeed, the identity of the 
organization as service provider appears to have been 
determinative for the Tribunal, as it stated in its spectrum 
analysis that it would not require the Catholic Church to rent its 
Parish Church space for the reception against its core religious 
beliefs, but that it would have no difficulty compelling a 
commercial enterprise, such as that in Brockie, to rent its hall.135 
It is not clear how the Tribunal reconciled this reasoning with its 
conclusion that it would not force any person with a sincerely 
held religious belief to act against that belief. After all, Mr. 
                                                          
132 Id. 
133 See supra notes 32–48 and accompanying text. 
134 Knights of Columbus, 2005 BCHRT 544 at paras. 127–28. 
135  Id. at para. 109. 
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Brockie was the owner of just such a business, and a commercial 
marriage hall might be owned by someone with views similar to 
those of the Knights. An additional difficulty arises in this regard.  
The premise of the spectrum analysis as applied in this case 
seems to create an exemption based on the religious identity of 
the service provider. However, the B.C. Code already has an 
exemption for religious organizations, an exemption that did not 
apply in this case. At the least, the Tribunal should have 
attempted to reconcile its spectrum-analysis exemption with the 
existing statutory exemption. 
Second, the Tribunal adopted an absolutist position—that it 
would not have forced the organization to do anything that 
violated is members’ core beliefs, even in the public domain—
which is wrong both in principle and in law. The logic in Knights 
could lead to even more severe and absurd results, as it would 
seem to justify any discrimination as long as there was a sincerely 
held core religious belief. What if, for example, the Knights 
organization, on the basis of a sincerely held religious belief, 
refused to work with LGBTQ couples, would not refer them to 
another venue, and perhaps even felt it immoral to be near with 
them (and therefore put up signs in the window indicating that 
LGBTQ people would not be served)? On the logic of the Knights 
Tribunal, this discriminatory conduct could be justified and may 
be protected.  The Tribunal’s absolutist reasoning undermines the 
very basis of the human rights antidiscrimination laws, which 
were designed specifically to compel people to act against their 
convictions if those convictions would lead to discriminatory 
results. To be fair, it is hard to know whether the Knights 
Tribunal intended to take such an extreme position, given its 
conclusion that the organization had in fact discriminated.  
The Eadie Tribunal, in the first part of is BFRJ analysis, used 
similar reasoning, but reached a different conclusion as to the 
function of the service being provided by the Riverbend. This 
Tribunal accepted that the Riverbend owners sincerely believed 
allowing a same-sex couple to share a bed in their home would 
harm the owners’ relationship to their Lord.136 Nonetheless, the 
                                                          
136 Eadie v. Riverbend Bed & Breakfast, 2012 BCHRT 247, para. 139. 
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Tribunal found that the owners had not established a bona fide 
and reasonable justification for their discriminatory conduct.137 
Here, as in Knights, the conclusion hinged on the definition of 
the function of the service. In Eadie, the Tribunal defined the 
function of the bed and breakfast without reference to the owners’ 
religious views, finding that the Riverbend’s function was to 
provide temporary accommodation to the general public.138  
Therefore, the Tribunal concluded, the rule excluding couples 
who were not a married man and woman was not rationally 
connected to this purpose of providing temporary 
accommodation.139 The two cases together provide a clear 
illustration of how the definition of the service’s function 
effectively determines the rest of the analysis, but is not helpful in 
resolving the belief-based exemption cases. If the function is 
defined, as in Knights, in relation to the service providers’ 
religious beliefs, they will be granted near-absolute protection for 
these beliefs, subject to the duty to accommodate. If the function 
is defined without reference to the service providers’ religious 
beliefs, as in Eadie, they will be left without any protection, 
despite the fact that they appear to have believed just as fervently 
as the Knights did that their business should be run without 
harming their relationship with their Church or with their Lord. 
Such absolutist conclusions in both cases do not leave room for 
nuance or balancing.  
For the sake of caution, the Eadie Tribunal did not stop at the 
first part of the BFRJ analysis.  In its decision on the third part of 
the analysis assessing the duty to accommodate, the Tribunal 
addressed a number of issues. It considered the argument that the 
Riverbend was in the owners’ home.140 The Tribunal held that 
there was no statutory exception available for “services” in a 
situation of shared sleeping, bathroom, or cooking facilities, to 
parallel the statutory exception for tenancy in such 
                                                          
(Can.). 
137 Id. at para. 145. 
138 Id. at para. 141. 
139 Id. at para. 144. 
140 Id. at paras. 151–53. 
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circumstances.141 The Tribunal concluded that those parts of the 
Riverbend occupied by guests were properly characterized as 
business premises.142 What underlies this formalistic discussion 
may be the idea that intimacy between service provider and the 
recipients of the service could in very exceptional cases justify a 
belief-based exemption, or minimize the duty to accommodate. 
No such level of intimacy was reached by renting a room in a bed 
and breakfast.  
Next, the Eadie Tribunal considered the religiosity of the 
Riverbend. It conducted a spectrum analysis, concluding that the 
Riverbend was “more toward the commercial end of the 
spectrum . . . . While the business was operated by individuals 
with sincere religious beliefs respecting same-sex couples, and 
out of a portion of their personal residence, it was still a 
commercial activity.”143 
The Tribunal also considered the Riverbend’s clientele, 
concluding that they were not restricted to the Christian 
community.144 The Tribunal refrained from deciding whether this 
would have made a difference to the decision.  
The focus on religiosity seems to imply that religious 
institutions who wish to discriminate in providing services to the 
public could enjoy a lower duty to accommodate. As discussed 
above, an exemption or diminished duty to accommodate based 
on the religious identity of the service provider is rife with issues, 
as it lacks nuance and does not leave room for consideration of 
factors such as the impact of the harm. A test hinging on the 
religiosity of the service provider may also lend itself to absolutist 
conclusions, as appears to have been the case in Eadie.  
The Tribunal also held that as it was the owners’ decision to 
run a business in their home, in this they were not compelled by 
the state to act contrary to their religious beliefs.145 The Tribunal 
acknowledged that being religious practitioners in the public 
                                                          
141 Id. at para. 160. 
142 Id. at para. 161. 
143 Id. at para. 165 (emphasis added). 
144 Id. at para. 166. 
145 Id. at para. 165. 
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domain may carry a cost (in money, tradition, or inconvenience), 
but stated that such costs are less serious than a limit that 
effectively deprives the adherent of any meaningful choice with 
respect to their practice.146 Having decided that the owners were 
not deprived of a meaningful choice with respect to the exercise 
of their religion, the Tribunal concluded:  
[T]heir choice or mode of business operation may 
be limited by their religious practice. Having 
entered into the commercial sphere, the Molnars 
(owners), like other business people, were required 
to comply with the laws of the Province, including 
the Code, which is quasi-constitutional legislation 
that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.147  
Thus the Eadie Tribunal appeared to be saying that business 
people who choose to enter the commercial sphere may not 
discriminate. This too is near-absolutist reasoning, as the 
Tribunal appeared to be ruling out religious freedom exemptions 
for any person providing services in the public domain who is not 
acting in furtherance of a religious goal. This included the 
owners, despite their strong personal religious views. It could 
also include a female massage therapist who, for religious 
reasons, does not accept adult male customers. 
The Tribunal’s reasoning on this point is not persuasive.  
Harms to religious freedom are constitutional infringements, 
which must be acknowledged as such and balanced against the 
relevant countervailing interests, as discussed below. It is also 
unpersuasive to assert that “simply” asking people to change their 
mode of business does not constitute an interference with their 
freedom of religion. Asking people to change or move their 
business because they are not in compliance with the law is 
coercive, whether the owner chooses to shut down their business 
(as the owners did subsequently in Eadie) or to comply with the 
law against their own convictions. Such coercion may be 
justified, as it was in Eadie, but the impact on the owners can 
                                                          
146 Id. at para. 168 
147 Id. at para. 169. 
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nonetheless still be acknowledged.  
What the analyses in Knights and Eadie demonstrate are the 
challenges created when trying to balance equality with freedom 
of religion within a bona fide and reasonable justification test as 
applied in these cases. The Tribunals engaged in awkward 
discussions and reached unlikely conclusions, inserting religious 
beliefs into the function of a wedding hall and determining that a 
bed and breakfast was “more” on the commercial end of the 
spectrum. A straightforward balancing exercise, like that under 
section 1 of the Charter, would be preferable,148 similar to that 
conducted by the courts in Marriage Commissioners and in 
Brockie.149 Though the court reached the wrong conclusion in the 
latter case, these courts were able to ask themselves the correct 
questions and consider nuanced solutions.  
On the facts in Eadie, a balancing exercise could consider the 
equality rights of the complainants, assess the actual harms they 
suffered, as well as the social context and greater harms that may 
occur if the owners could single out LGBTQ people for 
discrimination. It could weigh this against the religious freedom 
of the owners, the actual harms they would suffer if prohibited 
from discriminating, and the greater social context. In a belief-
based exemption case such as this, one party or the other may end 
up feeling forced out of the public domain. Indeed, some might 
consider this to have been the fate of the Riverbend owners, who 
did in fact leave the public domain and shut down their bed and 
breakfast following the Tribunal’s decision prohibiting them from 
discriminating. If anyone has to leave the public domain, in most 
instances, it likely should be those who want to be kept apart, to 
exclude or discriminate.  
Moreover, in the Eadie and Knights cases, as well as the 
                                                          
148 This appears to be the method proposed by the Ontario Human Rights 
Commission for those situations where reconciliation is not possible.  See 
ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, POLICY ON COMPETING HUMAN RIGHTS 
(2012), available at http://www.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/policy%20 
on%20competing%20human%20rights_accessible_2.pdf.  
149  In re Marriage Comm’rs Appointed under the Marriage Act, 2011 
SCKA 3 (Can.); Ontario Human Rights Comm’n v. Brockie (2002), 161 
O.A.C. 324 (Can. On. Sup. Ct. J.). 
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others discussed in this Article, it is likely no coincidence that 
those who created the exclusionary rule were those with greater 
social capital, while those who would have been excluded 
belonged to a group that has experienced, and continues to 
experience, discrimination and marginalization. This too may be 
relevant context in determining the outcome of these cases. Had 
the Eadie Tribunal engaged in such a balancing exercise, it could 
have concluded, as this Article would, that the individual and 
social benefits of preventing discrimination against a couple on 
the basis of their sexual orientation in the specific, social, and 
historical context of this case outweigh the deleterious impact on 
the owners.  
This conclusion, that the owners in Eadie should not be 
permitted to discriminate, is simple albeit coercive. However, 
there is nothing earth-shattering in the proposition that law 
coerces. The human rights laws work ex ante by prohibiting 
discrimination, and ex post facto by enforcing coercive measures 
where discrimination has taken place. The coercive nature of 
these laws has not changed since they were first established with 
the purpose of forcing individuals and businesses to serve, 
employ, and house people of different religions and races, against 
the sometimes deeply held convictions of those who would have 
otherwise discriminated. The importance of the antidiscrimination 
measures justifies the creation of these coercive human rights 
laws and continues to justify their implementation. This is 
particularly true for anti-LGBTQ discrimination in the current 
Canadian context. That said, it is still necessary for a court or 
Tribunal to examine each belief-based exemption case on its 
facts. 
 
D. Reference re Constitutional Act, 1978 (Saskatchewan):150 
Should Civil Marriage Commissioners Be Exempt From 
Solemnizing Marriages Contrary to Their Religious 
Beliefs? 
 
In 2004 and 2005, same-sex marriage was legally recognized 
                                                          
150 In re Marriage Comm’rs, 2011 SCKA 3. 
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across Canada following a series of constitutional challenges151 
and ultimately, new federal legislation.152 This tremendous change 
raised a new legal and constitutional question with respect to 
belief-based exemptions.  In the province of Saskatchewan, eight 
marriage commissioners resigned after being informed that they 
were required to perform same-sex marriage ceremonies, while 
others filed human rights complaints claiming that their freedom 
of religion and their right to carry on an occupation without 
religious discrimination had been violated. Other human rights 
complaints and litigation followed.  
Eventually, the Lieutenant Governor in Council asked the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal to provide an advisory opinion, 
known as a reference, on the constitutionality of two alternative 
possible amendments to the province’s Marriage Act.153 The 
court’s opinion, although not legally binding, was provided in the 
form of a judicial decision: this is the Marriage Commissioners 
decision.154 The two possible amendments under consideration in 
this case, if passed into law, would have created a belief-based 
exemption for marriage commissioners by allowing them to 
decline to solemnize a marriage if it would be contrary to their 
religious beliefs. The first option would have made the exemption 
available only to those marriage commissioners appointed on or 
before November 5, 2004—the date on which the courts in 
Saskatchewan recognized same-sex marriage.155 The second 
                                                          
151 See, e.g., W. (N.) v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), 2004 SKQB 434 (Can.); 
Halpern v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [2003] O.J. No. 2268 (QL), sub nom., 
Halpern v. Toronto (2003), 172 O.A.C. 276 (Can. Ont. C.A.); Ligue 
Catholique pour les droits de l’homme c. Hendricks, [2004] Q.J.No. 2593 
(Can. Que.), sub nom., Hendricks c. Québec (Procureure générale), [2004] 
R.J.Q. 851 (Can. Que. C.A.); EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), 
2003 BCCA 251 (Can. B.C. C.A.).  
152 Civil Marriage Act, S.C. 2005, c. 33 (Can.). 
153 The Marriage Act, 1995, S.S. 1995, c. M-4.1 (Can.). The Lieutenant 
Governor in Council is the Saskatchewan Cabinet, with the approval of the 
Lieutenant Governor.  
154 2011 SKCA 3 (Can.). 
155 The operative part of the first option reads as follows: 
28.1(1) Notwithstanding The Saskatchewan Human Rights 
Code, a marriage commissioner who was appointed on or 
2014.05.05 AVIV.DOCX 5/11/2014  12:35 PM 
 (WHEN) CAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM JUSTIFY 653 
option would have made the exemption available to all marriage 
commissioners in the province, regardless of the date of their 
appointment.156 The court’s analysis addressed both possible 
exemptions together.  
The court held that these exemptions would, if enacted, be 
unconstitutional and invalid: they would violate the equality rights 
of LGBTQ individuals guaranteed in section 15 of the Charter; 
this infringement of section 15 would be unreasonable and 
unjustifiable under the Charter’s section 1 reasonable limits test, 
as the proposed exemptions would not be minimally impairing, 
and their harms would far outweigh their benefits. 
This case, similar to Chamberlain, did not involve a private 
actor in the role of service-provider. Indeed, the majority’s 
decision was based in large part on the fact that marriage 
commissioners act as government officials. Nonetheless, there is 
a great deal in the Marriage Commissioners decision that is 
helpful for exploring the issue of belief-based exemptions—for 
the most part because of its contribution to this debate, in 
particular its section 1 analysis, but also, with respect, because of 
its flaws. The issues raised include the following: whether the 
purpose of the proposed exemptions was to protect religious 
freedom or to facilitate discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation;157 who may define religious beliefs, and the oft-cited 
yet problematic distinction between religious beliefs and acts; the 
deleterious effects of the exemptions, and their impact on 
individuals and society, particularly if institutionalized and 
                                                          
before November 5, 2004 is not required to solemnize a 
marriage if:  
(a) to do so would be contrary to the marriage 
commissioner’s religious beliefs; and 
(b) the marriage commissioner has filed the notice 
mentioned in subsection (2) within the period mentioned 
in that subsection.  
Id. at para. 17. 
156 The second option reads: “28.1 Notwithstanding The Saskatchewan 
Human Rights Code, a marriage commissioner is not required to solemnize a 
marriage if to do so would be contrary to the marriage commissioner’s 
religious beliefs.” Id. 
157 Id. at paras. 74, 78–79, 115. 
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legitimized through official policy; and again, the slippery slope 
of exemptions that could be justified if the proposed exemptions 
were permitted.158 This Article shares many of the court’s 
conclusions, but differs on the question of religious freedom and 
the right of individuals to define their religious views and 
priorities for themselves. 
 
1. Factual Background, Charter Analysis, Equality, the LGBTQ-
Specific Context, and the Purpose of the Exemptions 
 
The court’s factual findings established the background to this 
case, as follows: marriage commissioners in Saskatchewan are 
appointed by the Minister and provide the only route to marriage 
for individuals who want a nonreligious ceremony.159 Indeed, the 
Marriage Act specifies the requirements and the wording for a 
civil ceremony—and these are strictly nonreligious. Individuals 
wanting a civil marriage may receive contact information through 
the provincial government, following which they can contact a 
commissioner directly.160 According to the court, this route would 
be the only one available to many gay and lesbian couples who 
want to get married.161 
The two proposed amendments to the province’s Marriage 
Act at issue162 would have exempted all or some of these civil 
marriage commissioners from the duty to solemnize a marriage, 
if doing so would be contrary to their religious beliefs.163 The 
court was asked to provide its opinion on the constitutional 
validity of these proposed exemptions. Applying the established 
test, the court began its analysis by considering whether the 
proposed exemptions infringed a Charter right or freedom. It 
concluded that the exemptions did in fact violate the right to 
equality under section 15 of the Charter. It then fell to the court 
                                                          
158 Id. at para. 90. 
159 Id. at para. 9. 
160 Id. at para. 8. 
161 Id. at para. 9. 
162 The Marriage Act, 1995, S.S. 1995, c. M-4.1 (Can.); see also supra  
notes 155–56. 
163 See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text. 
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to determine whether the exemptions constituted a reasonable 
limit on this right such that they could be justified under section 1 
of the Charter.164  
Applying the section 1 analysis to the exemptions, the court 
first considered the purpose of the exemptions.  The majority 
(though not the concurrence) held that the purpose of the 
exemptions—to protect freedom of religion—was pressing and 
substantial, thus satisfying this branch of the test.165 Second, the 
majority held that the proposed amendments were rationally 
connected to this purpose, in that the exemptions would indeed 
protect marriage commissioners’ religious freedom.166 However, 
on the third—minimal impairment branch of the section 1 
analysis—the majority found that the exemptions were more 
restrictive than necessary to achieve their objective.167 Given the 
possibility of an alternative method for matching couples with 
marriage commissioners—a method that would have harmed 
equality rights less than the proposed exemptions—the majority 
concluded that the exemptions were not minimally impairing, not 
a reasonable limit on the right to equality, and as such, they were 
unconstitutional.168 The court decided to provide its opinion as 
well on the fourth, and final, branch of the section 1 analysis and 
concluded that the deleterious effects of the exemptions far 
outweighed their salutary effects. For this reason as well, the 
exemptions did not constitute a reasonable limit and were 
unconstitutional. 
Aspects of the court’s Charter analysis raise interesting, 
insightful, helpful, at times controversial, and even troubling 
elements, all of which are illuminating in the context of a larger 
discussion about belief-based exemptions. It is these elements that 
will be drawn out for a more detailed discussion below.  
In the initial stage of its Charter analysis, the majority 
considered whether the proposed exemptions infringed a Charter 
                                                          
164 For the reasonable limits test, see supra notes 7–9 and accompanying 
text. 
165  Marriage Comm’rs, 2011 SKCA 3 at para. 82. 
166  Id. 
167  Id. at para. 88. 
168  Id. at para. 101. 
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right. It concluded that the exemptions would curtail the Charter’s 
right to equality under section 15. Its conclusion was based on the 
following findings: an exemption could lead to any number of 
commissioners refusing to perform same-sex marriages; the 
impact of such refusals on an LGBTQ couple could be very 
significant and genuinely offensive; and even if a few 
commissioners opted out of performing same-sex marriages, 
LGBTQ couples looking for a commissioner might face some 
inconvenience, could have to deal with numerous refusals, and 
they may encounter real difficulty in small or remote locations. 
Also, in light of historical discrimination and mistreatment of 
LGBTQ individuals, allowing marriage commissioners to refuse a 
same-sex couple service “would clearly be a retrograde step—a 
step that would perpetuate disadvantage and involve stereotypes 
about the worthiness of same-sex unions.”169 
In the next stage, it was necessary to conduct a Charter 
section 1 analysis to determine whether the infringement of the 
right to equality could be justified as a reasonable limit on this 
right. If so, the exemptions would be constitutional. To begin the 
section 1 analysis, the court needed to establish the purpose of the 
proposed exemptions. These exemptions were drafted broadly 
and would have allowed a marriage commissioner to refuse to 
perform any kind of marriage, such as an inter-faith union.170 
And indeed, the majority found that the purpose of the 
exemptions was to protect the religious freedom of marriage 
commissioners by relieving them of their duty to perform any 
marriage contrary to their religious beliefs.171 That said, Justice 
Richards, writing for the majority, focused his analysis 
specifically on one kind of situation—a refusal to solemnize the 
marriage of a same-sex couple—as there was no evidence of any 
other kind of refusal and because same-sex marriage was in fact 
the issue underlying the debate.172  
The concurrence delivered by Justice Smith went further, 
                                                          
169 In re Marriage Comm’rs Appointed under the Marriage Act, 2011 
SKCA 3, para 45 (Can.). 
170 Id. at para. 24. 
171 Id. at para. 76. 
172 Id. at paras. 104–09. 
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considering, clarifying, and redefining the purpose of the 
proposed exemptions.173 According to the concurrence, the 
objective of the exemptions was not simply to accommodate the 
religious freedom of marriage commissioners, but to permit 
marriage commissioners to refuse to perform same-sex marriage 
ceremonies when doing so would conflict with their religious 
beliefs.174 The facts underlying this conclusion were not difficult 
to demonstrate, particularly given that one of the two proposed 
exemptions was drafted specifically as a grandfathering option for 
those marriage commissioners appointed on or before the date 
that same-sex marriage was recognized in Saskatchewan. The 
concurring opinion concluded that this objective was not 
“pressing and substantial,” as required by section 1 of the 
Charter, or at the least it was doubtful whether this objective met 
the required threshold.175  
What is particularly useful here is the insistence (by the 
concurrence, and perhaps in its wake, the majority), that the 
analysis be situated in its specific context. In this case, the issue 
was not simply one of religious freedom versus equality. It was 
squarely about discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 
And those who would be most harmed by the exemptions’ 
discriminatory effect were LGBTQ individuals. Providing 
detailed context and considering the identity, circumstances, and 
history of those who would be impacted by the denial of service 
will be critical for various stages of the analysis in any belief-
based exemption case. 
 
2. Minimal Impairment and the Single Entry Point System 
 
As to whether such a limit on equality rights was justifiable, 
the court found that the exemptions failed the minimal 
impairment test,176 as there was at least one alternative system 
that could harm individuals’ equality rights less than the proposed 
                                                          
173 Id. at paras. 115–30. 
174 Id. at para. 154. 
175 Id. at para. 152. 
176 The minimal impairment test requires that for a limit to be reasonable, 
it must “limit rights no more than necessary.” Id. at para. 83. 
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exemptions.177 This alternative, known as the “single entry point” 
system,178 would allow couples seeking a marriage commissioner 
to apply through a central office, at which point they would 
provide information about themselves (i.e., their genders). After 
this, the Director of the Marriage Unit would provide them with a 
list of available commissioners. The list provided to the couple 
would exclude those commissioners not prepared to officiate—all 
of which could have been established privately and “behind the 
scenes.”179 Such a system, the majority held, would be less 
harmful than the proposed exemptions, as it would accommodate 
marriage commissioners’ beliefs; the accommodation would not 
be readily apparent to an LGBTQ couple; and the couple would 
not risk being refused service because of their sexual orientation. 
The court, however, was careful to explain that the discussion 
about the single entry point system did not prove the system’s 
constitutionality. It only served to prove the lack of 
constitutionality of the proposed exemptions which would be even 
more harmful to individuals’ equality rights.180 
The single entry point system is indeed flawed. While it could 
mercifully shield LGBTQ couples arranging their weddings from 
the indignity and pain of a refusal, it would still include a request 
for information about a person’s gender, which should be 
irrelevant once same-sex marriage is recognized, and which is 
always problematic for transgender people. This system would 
also do nothing to shield the people “behind the scenes” from 
having to work with and implement this policy. Marriage 
commissioners and their associates, the Director of the Marriage 
Unit, and clerical and technical staff may themselves be LGBTQ, 
have a loved one who is, and/or have a deeply held belief in the 
equality, dignity, and worth of all people. Being required to work 
with a single entry point system would require such individuals to 
fill out forms, enter data, manage lists, and so forth in a context 
that would facilitate the singling out of LGBTQ people for 
                                                          
177 Indeed, there was a suggestion that a system of this kind operated in 
Toronto. Id. at para. 87. 
178 Id. at para. 85. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at para. 89. 
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exclusion. As will be discussed below, the very creation of an 
official ex ante policy allowing people to opt out of performing 
same-sex marriages sends a problematic message legitimizing this 
refusal.181  
 
3. Salutary Effects and Defining Religious Beliefs 
 
On the final branch of the section 1 analysis, the court 
engaged in a balancing exercise to weigh the deleterious effects of 
the exemptions against their salutary ones.182 The exemptions’ 
benefits, the majority stated, were intended to protect marriage 
commissioners from having to do certain actions contrary to their 
religious beliefs. While these beliefs may be significant for some 
commissioners, the majority held that the benefits of the 
exemptions were less significant than they appear because: 
the freedom of religion interests [that the 
exemptions] accommodate do not lie at the heart of 
[section] 2(a) of the Charter.  [The exemptions] are 
concerned only with the ability of marriage 
commissioners to act on their beliefs in the world 
at large. They do not in any way concern the 
freedom of commissioners to hold the religious 
beliefs they choose or to worship as they wish.183 
While agreeing with the majority’s conclusion that the 
exemptions’ harms far outweigh their benefits, this Article does 
not accept the distinction, invoked as well by the concurrence, 
between acting on beliefs and holding them as an appropriate 
method of determining the significance of a restriction. More 
generally, and with respect, the proposition that in defining a 
person’s religious freedom, courts can rely on the distinction 
between “belief and conduct”184—a distinction frequently cited in 
freedom of religion and equality cases—may be factually 
                                                          
181 See infra Part II.D.4. This point was made by the concurrence about 
the exemptions themselves. Marriage Comm’rs, 2011 SKCA 3 at para. 107. 
182 Id. at para. 90. 
183 Id. at para. 93. 
184 See, e.g., Trinity W. Univ. v. Coll. of Teachers (1998), 169 D.L.R. 
4th 234, para. 36 (Can. B.C. C.A.). 
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inaccurate and is philosophically unsound. This distinction 
privileges one subjective understanding of religion over others. 
While it is true that some religions are based primarily on faith 
and worship, there is a diversity of religious and spiritual 
systems, expressions, and practices that should not be 
overlooked. For some adherents and religions, faith or attendance 
at a house of worship may be less religiously and spiritually 
significant than, for example: acts of charity; ethical behaviour 
(whether others agree or not with aspects of these ethical 
systems); or ways of being in the world (including dietary 
regimes, modes of dress, and laws around sexual behaviour). In 
other words, for many adherents, their core religious freedom 
may be dependent on the freedom to conduct themselves 
according to a system of ethics and practices prescribed by their 
religion. This is not to say that one can never limit religious 
practices—such limits can and should take place in various 
situations, including the case under discussion. However, a 
meaningful analysis should rely on the actual religious worldview 
of the individual in question, not on the court’s subjective beliefs 
about what constitutes religion. 
The concurring opinion also dealt with the questions of how 
to define—and who should define—religious beliefs deserving of 
section 2(a) freedom. For instance, given the nonreligious nature 
of civil marriage and the importance of the civil scheme, the 
concurrence asked “in precisely what respect being compelled to 
perform a same-sex marriage can offend the religious freedom of 
a marriage commissioner.”185 Justice Smith’s intention, she 
explained, was not to question the sincerity of the belief, but 
rather to examine the significance of the societal harm the 
exemptions are intended to remedy and to what extent freedom of 
religion is offended by requiring marriage commissioners to 
perform same-sex marriages.186  
This is, with respect, a strange question. If a person were 
asked to participate in a ritual that was offensive to their sincere 
moral or ethical core, surely this would be a violation of section 
                                                          
185 Marriage Comm’rs, 2011 SKCA 3 at para. 129. 
186 Id. at para. 130. 
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2(a). Like equality, freedom of religion is a value. And this value 
would be harmed if people were required to act against their 
beliefs (including beliefs as to how they may and may not conduct 
themselves). It will nonetheless be open to a court to determine 
whether another conflicting value, such as equality, will receive 
greater protection in a particular context.  
The concurrence also turned to the evidence and analysed the 
beliefs expressed by various affiants, including the following 
statement: “[M]onogamous, non-polygamous, heterosexual 
marriage is . . . a uniquely Christian doctrine. A Christian must 
always recognize marriage as such, and understand that any 
attempt on the part of society to define it in any other way is 
disobedience to the Covenant and incurs the righteous judgment 
of God.”187 The concurrence attempted to demonstrate that 
refusals to perform same-sex marriage are not reasonable, 
plausible, or compliant with the law. Justice Smith also held that 
performing a same-sex marriage does not necessarily imply 
approval of the union. And she asserted that “[t]he performance 
of a civil marriage by a marriage commissioner under the Act is 
not a religious rite or practice. Nor does the requirement to do so 
limit or restrict religious belief.”188 
Justice Smith’s analysis with respect to defining religious 
beliefs and freedom was erroneous. First, the concurrence was 
asking itself the wrong questions when it tried to assess the 
reasonableness, plausibility, or legal coherence of the refusals. 
Religious beliefs do not become less religiously true just because 
they may be unreasonable or implausible. Second, Justice Smith 
held that performing a marriage does not imply approval of the 
marriage. While this assertion may be true for the respected 
Justice, it directly contradicts the evidence of the affiants who 
expressed concerns about condoning or approving of these unions 
by virtue of solemnizing the marriages, as cited by Justice Smith 
herself. Finally, the concurrence seemed to suggest that only 
religious rites can be relevant to an infringement of a person’s 
religious belief. This suggestion is unfounded. If a person is 
                                                          
187 Id. at para. 135 (emphasis added). 
188 Id. at para. 147. 
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forced to violate a religious prohibition (such as eating pork, 
having a blood transfusion,189 or removing a religiously mandated 
ritual object),190 this may well be a violation of their religious 
freedom even where no religious rite is involved. 
The question of how to define “core” religiosity or significant 
harms to religious freedom is one that recurs in the equality and 
freedom of religion cases. With respect, the concurrence’s 
analysis in this regard seemed to demonstrate a conceptual 
difficulty in grasping the nature of religious or conscientious 
belief and practice. This was particularly evident from the fact 
that Justice Smith found only a weak to nonexistent interference 
with religious freedom, despite having cited to an affidavit 
expressing an individual’s fear about incurring “the righteous 
judgment of God.”191  
Religious beliefs (with respect to worship, conduct, and 
practice) are subjective and personal. Their range and expression 
may be diverse, their content may be irrational and idiosyncratic, 
and they may contain values that are anathema to others. Courts 
and tribunals adjudicating belief-based exemption cases should 
engage in a serious contemplation of freedom of religion that 
allows for the possibility that such beliefs are nonetheless real for 
the adherent.  
It is not the role of the judge to define others’ beliefs based on 
their own logic and understanding. The role of the court, when 
freedom of religion is claimed, is to test the evidence with respect 
to sincerity of belief and the scope of the purported harm to the 
individual.  It is also the courts’ role to limit these sincerely held 
core beliefs if this is justified under section 1 of the Charter. 
 
  
                                                          
189  See, e.g., Manitoba v. C. (A.), [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181 (Can.). 
190 See, e.g., Multani v. Comm’n scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoy, [2006] 1 
S.C.R. 256 (Can.). 
191 Marriage Comm’rs, 2011 SKCA 3 at para. 135. 
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4. Deleterious Effects: Individual Harms and the Broader 
Context, Ex Ante Permission to Exclude, and the Slippery Slope 
of Exemptions 
 
Having established a conflict between religious freedom and 
equality, the critical phase of the analysis in belief-based 
exemption cases may well take place in the test that weighs the 
benefits of a measure against its harms. The majority in Marriage 
Commissioners found that the first deleterious effect of the 
proposed exemptions was the fact that they would undermine the 
struggle for equality generally, and  
perpetuate a brand of discrimination which our 
national community has only recently begun to 
successfully overcome. It would be a significant 
step backward if, having won the difficult fight for 
the right to same-sex civil marriages, gay and 
lesbian couples could be shunned by the very 
people charged by the Province with solemnizing 
such unions.192 
The exemptions’ second deleterious effect, according to the 
majority, was in their harmful impact on individuals. To 
demonstrate this, the majority cited the testimony—from a 
different case in which a marriage commissioner denied service 
to an LGBTQ couple—of an individual who was denied service, 
giving voice to his experience and reaction. The man, M.J., had 
testified as follows: 
It was actually pretty devastating . . . . So when 
this happened I was quite devastated. I rehashed 
this I don’t know how much when I couldn’t sleep 
because I actually wound up sleeping very little. I 
was just crushed about it. I couldn’t believe that as 
a human being I wasn’t going to be treated as a 
real person.193 
The majority found that the negative and harmful effects of 
                                                          
192 Id. at para. 94.  
193 Id. at para. 95 (quoting M.J. v. Orville Nichols & Saskatchewan Att’y 
Gen. (2008), 63 C.H.R.R. D/145 (Can. Sask.)). 
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this kind of denial would affect not just those LGBTQ individuals 
denied services, but the LGBTQ community, their friends and 
family, and the public as a whole—as many members of the 
public would be hurt and offended by the idea that a 
governmental official would deny services to LGBTQ couples.194  
The third and “in some ways most important” deleterious 
effect of the exemptions, in the majority’s view, was that they 
would undermine the principle that the government serves 
everyone equally without discrimination.195 Marriage 
commissioners do their jobs as agents of the province. Individual 
public office-holders cannot expect to change the way the office 
interacts with the public to conform to their own beliefs, as this 
would be inconsistent with the principle of the rule of law.196 
Concurring Justice Smith discussed additional deleterious 
effects that the proposed exemptions would cause. She provided a 
detailed overview of the marriage solemnization regime. This 
included the fact that, according to her, a significant number of 
religious organizations disapprove of same-sex marriage, and 
thus, civil marriage may be the only route to marriage available 
for same-sex couples.197 For example, there were 138 religious 
bodies whose clergy may marry according to their rites and 
usages in the province, in contrast to the single prescribed form 
(including a set script) for a nonreligious marriage.198 And the 
number of clergy ever registered with the marriage unit (5,713) 
was contrasted with the number of marriage commissioners 
(578).199 These facts told a compelling story about the importance 
of maintaining an open, accessible, and impartial civil marriage 
option.  
The concurrence also described the impact of discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation and took the time to set out the 
broader context responsible for the “extreme vulnerability” of 
                                                          
194  Id. at para. 45. 
195 Id. at para. 97. 
196 Id. at para. 98. 
197 Id. at para 106. 
198 Id. at para. 119. 
199 Id. at paras. 119–28. 
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LGBTQ people to hatred and discrimination.200 She cited a well-
known and painful passage that described the historic and current 
disadvantages faced by this group, including: public harassment, 
verbal abuse, violence, exclusion from public life, a need to 
conceal identities and orientation, rejection by families, and, as a 
result of these, higher rates of suicide and attempted suicide.201  
Next, the concurrence explained, the harm goes further than 
the individual exemptions: “[E]ven if the risk of actual refusal 
were minimal, knowing that legislation would legitimize such 
discrimination is in itself an affront to the dignity and worth of 
homosexual individuals.”202 Thus, she concluded, what is at stake 
is not just the right of same-sex couples to marry, but the right of 
this vulnerable group to be free from discrimination in the 
provision of a public service, which is provided without 
discrimination to every other person in society.203 Justice Smith 
reinforced this point by demonstrating that there was no other 
legislative provision in the province explicitly operating in 
conflict with the provincial Human Rights Code.204 Her insight 
provides a coherent and persuasive message, demonstrating why 
an official policy whose effect is to permit exclusion against a 
particular group is so problematic:  
Astonishingly, this clause [the exemptions] would 
grant to a public official, charged with the delivery 
of a public service, an immunity to the 
antidiscrimination provisions of the Code not 
enjoyed by any other person in this Province. 
Moreover, in practice, it would deny to gays and 
lesbians the protection from discrimination that the 
Code provides to others. In the words of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Vriend, . . . this 
clause would send “a strong and sinister message” 
that “gays and lesbians are less worthy of 
                                                          
200 Id. at para. 107. 
201 Id.  
202 Id. 
203 Id. at para. 108. 
204 Id. at para. 161. 
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protection as individuals in Canada’s society.”205 
The existence of an official, ex ante policy allowing 
discrimination has serious consequences, whether the 
discriminatory policy at issue is the exemption permitting a 
marriage commissioner to refuse to marry a couple, or the single 
entry point system discussed above permitting marriage 
commissioners to opt out of performing these marriages behind 
the scenes. Such a policy can be implemented and discussed with 
co-workers, staff, and supervisors, and effectively conveys the 
message that this form of discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation is understood, expected, tolerated, and legitimized. 
Consider, by contrast, whether society would tolerate an official 
system allowing people, directly or behind the scenes, to 
discriminate on the basis of race or religion. The 
institutionalization of discrimination may serve to perpetuate, 
magnify, and increase it.  
Finally, the concurrence asserted, “if the proposed 
exemptions were constitutionally acceptable, [then] so too would 
be virtually any legislative [exemption]”206 allowing service 
providers to discriminate against same-sex couples, in the public 
or private sphere, on the basis of religious disapproval of the 
“same-sex lifestyle.”207 The logic underlying the exemptions, 
according to Justice Smith, would be to permit marriage 
commissioners to refuse to solemnize same-sex marriages, since 
in their view, performing such a marriage would connote 
approval of same-sex relationships, and this conflicts with their 
religious beliefs.208  
On this logic, Justice Smith stated, a wide range of service 
providers who disapprove of same-sex relationships could also try 
to justify discriminating against LGBTQ people if the disapproval 
was on religious grounds, which she found it frequently is.209 
These other service providers could include persons who rent 
                                                          
205 Id. at para. 158. 
206 Id. at para. 103. 
207 Id.  
208 Id. at para. 144. 
209 Id. at para. 145. 
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halls for marriage celebrations, sell marriage licenses, rent living 
accommodation to married couples, and provide restaurant meals 
or entertainment, as mentioned above.210  
It is arguable whether solemnizing a marriage is akin to 
selling popcorn to a couple at a romantic movie, given the closer 
nexus of the marriage commissioner and greater degree of 
personal involvement in the union. However, there is no question 
that the logic of disapproval on its own could apply in far too 
many situations of discrimination such as the examples discussed 
by the court in Brockie. Both a printer who refused to print 
editorial content and a printer who refused to print a business 
directory aimed at LGBTQ interests would likely have asserted 
their refusal on the basis of their disapproval.   
The conclusion reached by the majority and concurrence in 
Marriage Commissioners was the correct one, and a great deal of 
their analysis is extremely helpful in advancing the law about 
belief-based exemptions in the context of discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation. The proposed exemptions, if enacted, 
would not have been constitutional due to their deleterious 
effects, the particular harms of official and ex ante policies 
permitting discrimination, and the role of the marriage 
commissioners as agents of the province.  For all that, it should 
be recognized that for some individuals, solemnizing a same-sex 
marriage could go against their sincerely held religious beliefs, 
and they may choose to leave their position as marriage 
commissioner rather than be compelled to create the union. Being 
forced out of work is a significant and coercive result. However, 
when weighed against the proposed exemptions’ serious 
individual and social harms, these exemptions would not be 
constitutional, and the court was correct in finding that the right 
to equality in this case should prevail.   
 
III. CONCLUSION: CAN FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND EQUALITY BE 
RECONCILED? GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
A serious and dedicated approach to equality, freedom of 
                                                          
210 Id.  
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religion, and dignity acknowledges that people hold diverse views 
which will come into conflict from time to time. In addressing 
belief-based exemption cases, a few themes emerge that may help 
guide future cases. These can be derived from existing Canadian 
case law and from a critical analysis of some of the decisions. 
First, the issues at play are complex and cannot be resolved in 
the abstract.211 Freedom of religion and equality do not lend 
themselves to reconciliation in many of the belief-based 
exemption cases, and resorting to higher-order principles will 
generally not provide a solution, as these principles frequently 
apply to both rights.  
Religion is a subset of equality, as it is one of the prohibited 
grounds of discrimination. Freedom of religion also embodies 
elements of freedom of association and liberty. Equality likewise 
incorporates these elements. Both equality and freedom of 
religion may relate to a value system, which is sincerely believed 
in and deeply cherished by many individuals.  Indeed, the two are 
not mutually exclusive. For many religious individuals, a deeply 
held and cherished belief in the inherent dignity, equality, and 
worth of all people comes from their religious faith. And 
numerous religious individuals and groups have been involved in 
various antidiscrimination causes, including efforts to recognize 
same-sex marriage in Canada. Finally, the concept of dignity—
generally recognized as being at the heart of the right to 
equality—also underlies the protection of religious freedom, as 
pointed out by the dissent in Chamberlain and the court in 
Brockie. Thus, for example, if one is forced to pray to a foreign 
deity, touch an impure object, use one’s artistry or talents to tell a 
false story, or have one’s children taught an ideology that runs 
counter to one’s deeply held values—this may amount to a 
violation of dignity.   
In the result, where an individual or entity seeks an exemption 
based on their religious beliefs from the duty to provide services 
to the public without discrimination on the basis of sexual 
                                                          
211 See, e.g., Benjamin L. Berger, Key Theoretical Issues in the 
Interaction of Law and Religion: A Guide for the Perplexed, 19 CONST. F. 
CONSTITUTIONELL 41 (2011). 
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orientation, a theoretical reconciliation between equality and 
freedom of religion will often not be possible. Instead, individual 
exemptions should be examined on the basis of their concrete 
facts in context and on a case-by-case basis. Courts should 
consider evidence as to the specific individuals’ beliefs, the actual 
harms that would result from infringing a person’s religious 
freedom, as well as the actual harms from the discrimination. The 
examination should include not only the impact on individuals, 
but also the broader social, legal and historical discrimination and 
context at issue, as considered by the Tribunal in Eadie and the 
court in Marriage Commissioners. The section 1 Charter test 
provides a helpful framework for such an analysis and balancing 
exercise. 
Given that reconciliation between the rights is not likely, the 
second theme that emerges is that one party’s fundamental right 
may be violated, and a coercive solution may be necessary. This 
conclusion, while uncomfortable, would result regardless of 
which way the court decided. And coercive solutions are 
consistent with many other laws that force individuals to act in a 
manner they might not otherwise have chosen, including the 
human rights laws that prohibit discrimination.  
Third, adjudicators would do well to reflect on their own 
prejudices. Courts should avoid the kinds of hetero-normative 
assertions made by the dissent in Chamberlain, and focus instead 
on a respect for diversity on the basis of sexual orientation and 
gender identity.  
The fourth guiding principle, similarly, addresses a particular 
preconception that may preclude adjudicators from engaging 
seriously with the rights on both sides of the conflict. Some 
people sincerely feel that their religion prohibits them from 
participating in certain events or activities. Courts should not 
summarily dismiss, as the concurrence did in Marriage 
Commissioners,212 the difficulties faced by someone required to 
choose between their work, and their conscience and dignity, if 
forced to act against their beliefs. Nor should an adjudicative 
body impose its own understanding of religion on the person 
                                                          
212 See supra notes 184–90 and accompanying text. 
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seeking religious freedom. What the court can and should do is 
examine the evidence concerning both the sincerity of the belief 
and the possible harms that could occur if a person’s religious 
freedom is infringed. Courts must take seriously the possibility 
that individuals may be concerned about harming their 
relationship with their Lord or about the “righteous judgment of 
God.” Such sensitivity and consideration is not the end of the 
process, but it is necessary to examining and balancing the real 
issues at stake.  
The fifth principle that emerges from the case law is that 
official, sweeping, or ex ante exemptions permitting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the provision 
of services should be avoided. Such exemptions may send a 
message that discrimination is to be expected, tolerated, and 
legitimized, as reasoned by the concurrence in Marriage 
Commissioners, and could lead to the institutionalization and 
perpetuation of the discrimination.  
Finally, belief-based exemptions, if allowed at all, must be 
extremely rare and exceptional. None of the cases discussed in 
this Article presented a justified belief-based exemption. 
However, it is possible that such situations may occur. For 
example, as discussed, if a person is asked to participate in 
creating a product with which they disagree, an exemption might 
be justified if the requested product would be derogatory or 
hateful towards the service provider and/or hateful towards a 
group protected under the antidiscrimination laws.  
New situations may also bring to light the possibility of other 
exemptions. For instance, services that require the exceptionally 
intimate and personal involvement of a service provider in a 
relationship with which they disagree may generate a different 
conclusion than services requiring a more tenuous connection. 
For example, a sex therapist who refuses to work with a same-sex 
couple likely has a stronger argument, on the basis of intimacy, 
than an electrician who refuses to rewire that couple’s home. 
Even in the case of the sex therapist, however, and assuming that 
bona fide occupational requirements were not at issue, a case-
specific, contextual analysis is required that would consider the 
reason for the refusal, the question of minimal impairment, and 
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the deleterious and salutary effects of granting the requested 
exemption. Such an analysis may conclude in favour of the sex 
therapist because of the exceptional intimacy required, or it may 
reach the conclusion that the therapist should find a less intimate 
occupation.  
The danger of the slippery slope is significant in belief-based 
exemption cases, and balancing exercises to assess these cases 
give adjudicators wide discretion. Absent a strict exceptionality 
standard, there could be too many discriminatory refusals. Thus, 
for example, even if one were to take the standard from Brockie, 
in which a service provider may be exempt if the material 
conflicts with their core beliefs, and make it stricter by adding a 
requirement that the service provider must have a direct and 
personal involvement in the work, in its outcome, or with the 
customer, the list of possible exemptions would still be long. 
After all, many service providers are personally involved in their 
work and/or with customers, and some individuals do hold beliefs 
that would lead them to discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation or gender identity. Refusals that meet this description 
could include (to use recent Canadian and American examples): a 
florist asked to enhance the beauty of a wedding; bed and 
breakfast owners renting out a room in their home; or a wedding 
photographer whose job it is to create a lasting image of love and 
romance.  
It is not difficult to imagine any number of other situations 
that could also meet this standard, including: an architect asked to 
design a family home for a family they believe should not exist—
or a builder or interior designer with similar views; a lawyer, 
banker, or investment adviser asked to protect the property of 
children or a spouse in a family arrangement the service-provider 
considers invalid; a wedding planner, dress maker, or barber who 
objects to the wedding, or perhaps a hairdresser or manicurist 
who objects to the romance; a teacher whose beliefs run counter 
to parts or all of the curriculum; a police officer whose job may 
involve risking their own safety to protect an event (a Pride 
parade), ceremony (a same-sex marriage), or person (a politician 
active in promoting LGBTQ rights) that the police officer does 
not believe warrants such protection; a health provider or hospital 
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worker asked to convey information or provide assistance to the 
loved one of a patient—or asked to deliver a baby in a family 
arrangement of which they disapprove.  
It is difficult to accept the idea that doctors or police officers 
might refuse to save or protect individuals in any circumstances. 
It is also difficult to contemplate a society in which refusals to 
provide service that single out customers based on their sexual 
orientation could be commonly tolerated and institutionalized. It 
is for this reason that exemptions, if any, should be extremely 
rare and exceptional. After all, the human rights laws were 
passed because of people’s refusal to countenance a society in 
which discrimination would be tolerated. To countenance it now 
is deeply concerning in the face of pervasive and often socially 
accepted discrimination against people on the basis of their sexual 
orientation or gender identity. Accepting exemptions in any but 
the most exceptional of circumstances could lead to many acts of 
refusal and exclusion, and could legitimize and perpetuate this 
discrimination, undermining the very purpose of our human 
rights laws. Such a result would be out of balance and would not 
justify violating the dignity, equality, and fundamental rights of 
people in Canada. 
 
